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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of a turbulent presidential election, the resurgence of the Black 
Lives Matter movement, and stark backlash over same-sex marriage, immigration 
reform and transgender bathrooms, our country is no stranger to the concepts of 
bias and discrimination.  Likewise, our justice system faces scrutiny with claims of 
prevalent bias and prejudice within its midst.  Though our legal system is heralded 
as having been founded on the principles of fairness and equity, statistical and 
anecdotal evidence show that our courtrooms are rife with bias and 
discrimination.2  Moreover, despite the diversity of law school classes, our legal 
profession is homogenous, dominated by a single race and gender.3  In recently 
evaluating this issue, American Bar Association Immediate Past President Paulette 
Brown stated that “[d]iscrimination and harassment on the basis of gender, race, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, marital and socioeconomic status is, and 
unfortunately continues to be, a problem in our profession and in society.”4  She 
further noted that “[e]xisting steps have not been enough to end such 
discrimination and harassment” in the judicial system.5 
In response, on August 8, 2016, the American Bar Association (ABA) House 
of Delegates approved Resolution 109, which proposed an amendment to Model 
Rule 8.4 to incorporate an anti-harassment and anti-discrimination provision into 
the black letter rules governing the professional conduct of lawyers.6  Resolution 
109 sought to strengthen ethics protections for protected classes and advance the 
ABA’s goal of eliminating bias, harassment and discrimination in the legal 
profession.7 
Prior to the passage of Resolution 109, discrimination was addressed through 
Model Rule 8.4(d), which makes it professional misconduct for a lawyer “to 
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”8  However, 
the prior rule provided insufficient protection against discrimination and 
harassment for at least three reasons.  First, as articulated in Comment 3 of the 
rule, bias or prejudice by an attorney only rose to the level of misconduct if the 
discriminatory behavior occurred “in the course of representing a client” and only 
if the conduct met the high standard of being “prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.”9  Second, this anti-discrimination provision was absent from the black 
 
 2.  See infra Part II(A). 
 3.  See infra Part II(B). 
 4.  Transcript of American Bar Association Public Hearing at 6 (Feb. 7, 2016) (transcribing ABA 
Immediate Past President Paulette Brown’s address at the American Bar Association Public Hearing 
on Resolution 109), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional 
_responsibility/aba_model_rule%208_4_comments/february_2016_public_hearing_transcript.authche
ckdam.pdf. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See Annual Meeting 2016: ABA Amends Model Rules to Add Anti-Discrimination, Anti-Harassment 
Provision, AMER. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives /2016/08/ 
annual_meeting_20161.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017); see also AMER. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 109 
(ADOPTED AS REVISED) (2016). 
 7.  See AMER. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: REVISED RESOLUTION 2 (2016). 
 8.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 9.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1998) (emphasis added). 
MACRO FINAL Keith (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  6:55 PM 
CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN A POST-MODEL RULE 8.4(G) WORLD  3 
letter rules—it was only mentioned in the comments to the rule, which are 
advisory and not adopted by every state.10  Finally, the prior rule failed to address 
harassment at all. 
Resolution 109 added a new paragraph (g) to Model Rule 8.4 explicitly 
addressing discrimination and harassment in the black letter rules and expanding 
the bounds of conduct that may give rise to disciplinary action to “conduct related 
to the practice of law.”11  Though advisory, the new Comment 3 clarifies that 
discriminatory conduct “includes harmful verbal or physical conduct that 
manifests bias or prejudice towards others.”12  Moreover, the new Comment 4 
expands the breadth of interactions or conduct that could result in a violation, 
including “interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and 
others while engaged in the practice of law” and “participating in bar association, 
business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.”13 
Despite the incredible strides made because of Resolution 109, Model Rule 
8.4(g) leaves open a critical issue with implementation.  The new rule states that it 
is professional misconduct if a lawyer engages in conduct that the lawyer “knows 
or reasonably should know” is discrimination.14  This begs the question whether 
the rule obligates lawyers to become culturally competent or whether it 
encourages lawyers to blind themselves to bias present in the practice of law to 
avoid being subject to this rule.  In other words, how culturally competent is the 
“reasonable lawyer”?  Does the “reasonable lawyer” have no or limited training 
on cultural competency?  Or does the “reasonable lawyer” purposefully attempt 
to be culturally aware and mindful?  Though adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g) is a 
necessary step toward forestalling bias and discrimination in the judicial system, 
it will not sufficiently do so without the implementation of additional safeguards 
and a cultural shift within the legal profession. 
This Article first provides the history of Model Rule 8.4 and the concepts of 
bias and discrimination in the legal profession.  Next, this Article argues that it 
should no longer be acceptable for lawyers to turn a blind eye and insulate 
themselves and the legal profession from the obligation to make cultural 
competency a core aspect of legal education and practice.  It will first focus on legal 
education, urging the ABA to revise its accreditation standards to require cultural 
competency coursework.  It will then focus on the legal profession, urging states 
to take three steps—adopt Model Rule 8.4(g), revise, where applicable, its 
continuing legal education requirements to require cultural competency 
education, and hold lawyers accountable for violating the rule.  Finally, this Article 
proposes a revision to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to ensure that the 
judiciary is able to “perform the duties of judicial office . . . without bias or 
 
 10.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble & Scope [14] (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(“Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance 
with the Rules.”); id. at Preamble & Scope [21] (“The Comments are intended as guides to 
interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative.”). 
 11.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (emphasis added). 
 12.  Id. at r. 8.4 cmt. 3. 
 13.  Id. at r. 8.4 cmt. 4. 
 14.  Id. at r. 8.4(g). 
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prejudice.”15  Removing, as much as practical, bias and discrimination from our 
legal profession will encourage all lawyers and judges to become more self-aware. 
This, in turn, will ensure the fair and equitable treatment of all individuals 
partaking or engaged in our justice system. 
I. MODEL RULE 8.4 – ITS HISTORY & APPLICATION 
In 1983, the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates adopted the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which prescribe baseline standards of legal 
ethics and professional responsibility for attorneys in the United States.16  With the 
assistance of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility’s Policy 
Implementation Committee, each state, with the exception of California, has 
adopted rules of professional conduct that follow the format of or closely align 
with the Model Rules.17 
When the Model Rules were first adopted, they did not directly or indirectly 
address bias, discrimination, prejudice or harassment.  Eleven years later, the ABA 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (SCEPR) and the 
ABA Young Lawyers Division launched an effort to correct this omission, each 
proposing a new paragraph (g) to Model Rule 8.4.18  However, the initiative faced 
such strong opposition that the proposals were withdrawn before the House of 
Delegates could vote.19 
In 1998, the SCEPR and the ABA Criminal Justice Section reignited the 
initiative, each proposing new language to add an anti-discrimination provision 
into the Model Rules.  Rather than modifying the black letter rules, the separate 
proposals were combined into the preexisting Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4, and 
adopted by the House of Delegates at the ABA’s Annual Meeting in August 1998.20 
This read: 
A lawyer who in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words 
or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, 
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) 
when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice.  Legitimate 
advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d).  A trial 
judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory 
basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule.21 
 
 
 15.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 16.  Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profes
sional_conduct.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).  Prior to the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA’s 
standards of professional responsibility for lawyers were governed under the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, see MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980), and prior to the 
Model Code, governed under the Canons of Professional Ethics, see CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 1956). 
 17.  Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 16. 
 18.  See AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 2. 
 19.  See id. 
 20.  See id. 
 21.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1998). 
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As noted by Myles V. Lynk, Chair of the SCEPR, the House of Delegates’ 
adoption of the preexisting Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4 marked “the first and 
only time that a substantive provision in the rules was not added to a rule itself but 
was placed in a comment.”22 
A decade later, former ABA President Bill Neukum led an initiative to 
reformulate the ABA’s objectives into four goals adopted by the House of 
Delegates in 2008.23  Goal III, entitled “Eliminate Bias and Enhance Diversity,” 
includes two objectives: (i) “[p]romote full and equal participation in the 
association, our profession, and the justice system by all persons”; and (ii) 
“[e]liminate bias in the legal profession and the justice system.”24  In 2014, the ABA 
Commission on Women in the Profession, the ABA Commission on Racial and 
Ethnic Diversity in the Profession, the ABA Commission on Disability Rights, and 
the ABA Commission on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (collectively, the 
“Goal III Commissions”) sent a joint letter to the SCEPR, requesting that the Model 
Rules incorporate an anti-discrimination and anti-harassment provision.  In the 
letter, the Goal III Commissions noted that Model Rule 8.4(d) was insufficient to 
fulfill Goal III because it “[did] not facially address bias, discrimination, or 
harassment and [did] not thoroughly address the scope of the issue in the legal 
profession or legal system.”25  The Goal III Commissions further argued that the 
preexisting Comment 3: 
[A]ddresse[d] bias and prejudice only within the scope of legal representation and 
only when it [was] prejudicial to the administration of justice.  This limitation 
fail[ed] to cover bias or prejudice in other professional capacities (including 
attorneys as advisors, counselors, and lobbyists) or other professional settings 
(such as law schools, corporate law departments, and employer-employee 
relationships within law firms).  The comment also [did] not address harassment 
at all, even though the judicial rules do so.26 
The Goal III Commissions’ letter sparked an investigation by the SCEPR to 
determine whether and how the Model Rules should be amended to address 
discrimination, harassment and bias in the practice of law.  After forming a 
working group consisting of representatives from the SCEPR, the Association of 
Professional Responsibility Lawyers, the National Organization of Bar Counsel 
and each of the Goal III Commissions, the SCEPR engaged in deliberations for over 
a year.  On July 8, 2015, the SCEPR released a draft proposal for comment to amend 
 
 22.  Myles V. Lynk, Chair of the ABA Standing Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Resp., Remarks at 
the ABA House of Delegates Annual Meeting 2016 7:45-7:55 (Aug. 8, 2016) (emphasis added), 
http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2016/08/annual_meeting_20161.html. 
 23.  See AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 1. 
 24.  See ABA Mission and Goals, AMER. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/about_the 
_aba/aba-mission-goals.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 25.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 3 (citing Letter from Goal III Commissions to Paula J. 
Frederick, Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 2011-2014); see 
also AMER. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROF’L RESP., WORKING DISCUSSION DRAFT – 
REVISIONS TO MODEL RULE 8.4: LANGUAGE CHOICE NARRATIVE 1 (2015) (likewise acknowledging the 
limitation of Model Rule 8.4(d)).  
 26.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 2 (citing Letter from Goal III Commissions to Paula J. 
Frederick, Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 2011-2014). 
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Model Rule 8.4.27  Later that month, the SCEPR also hosted an open invitation 
roundtable discussion of the proposal at the ABA’s Annual Meeting.28  After 
receiving and evaluating numerous comments, the SCEPR published a revised 
draft of the proposal on December 22, 2015, invited written comments, and hosted 
a public hearing at the ABA Midyear Meeting in February 2016.29 
On May 31, 2016, the SCEPR filed its initial Resolution 109 and an 
accompanying report with the House of Delegates,30 which sparked significant 
controversy.31  Opponents raised several concerns regarding the implementation 
of the new rule.  First, opponents argued that historically, Model Rule 8.4 has been 
solely concerned with regulating attorney conduct that might adversely affect an 
attorney’s ability to practice law and with preserving the integrity of the judicial 
system. The new rule, they argued, addresses neither of those issues.32  Second, 
Model Rule 8.4(d) and the preexisting Comment 3 provides the proper level of 
guidance to lawyers, making inclusion of an anti-discrimination and anti-
harassment provision in the black letter of the rules unnecessary.33  Third, 
“attorneys may be subject to professional discipline for acting in accordance with 
their professional and moral judgment when making decisions about whether to 
accept, reject or withdraw from certain cases because attorneys will be forced to 
 
 27.  See id. at 4. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  AMER. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROF’L RESP., NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING 
(2015); see also AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 4; Comments to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4, 
AMER. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_ 
commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/modruleprofconduct8_4/mr_8_4_comments.html 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 30.  See AMER. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RESOLUTION (2016). 
 31.  See Lorelei Laird, Discrimination and Harassment Will Be Legal Ethics Violations Under ABA Model 
Rule, ABA J., Aug. 8, 2016, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/house_of_delegates_strongly_ 
agrees_to_rule_making_discrimination_and_harass (noting that Resolution 109 attracted 
“condemnation from politically conservative attorneys, some of whom sent a letter to ABA House of 
Delegates Chair Patricia Lee Refo, arguing that the rule harms free speech and religious freedom, and 
wrote an op-ed in the National Law Journal (sub. req.) insisting that the resolution was driven by ‘PC 
politics’ rather than professional ability”). 
 32.  See Ronald Rotunda, The ABA’s Control Over What Lawyers Say Around the Water Cooler, HARV. 
L. REC. (Oct. 4, 2016), http://hlrecord.org/2016/10/the-abas-control-over-what-lawyers-say-around-the-
water-cooler/ (“Is it the best use of scarce Bar resources to discipline lawyers who may violate a vague 
rule that prohibits some speech because the speech relates to conduct that does not violate state or 
federal law but does violate the new Rule 8.4(g)? It’s not as if the disciplinary authorities are looking 
for things to do. There are plenty of lawyers who are incompetent, commingle trust funds, or cheat 
third parties.”); Herbert W. Titus & William J. Olson, ‘PC’ Politics Drove ABA’s Proposed Rules Changes, 
NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202764489288/PC-Politics-Drove-
ABAs-Proposed-Rules-Changes?slreturn=20170027005211 (quoting Ben Strauss, past president of the 
Delaware State Bar Association, as stating that “the purpose of the rules delimiting ethical misconduct 
is ‘one that goes to the character that impacts on the person’s ability to deliver legal services,’ not one 
‘regulating social behavior,’” and arguing that “[l]egal ethics should be predicated on preserving the 
integrity of the lawyers and the tribunals before which they practice,” not on “violating today’s notion 
of ‘political correctness’”). 
 33.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 5. 
MACRO FINAL Keith (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  6:55 PM 
CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN A POST-MODEL RULE 8.4(G) WORLD  7 
take cases or clients they might have otherwise declined.”34  Fourth, the new rule 
conflicts with the well-known practices of jury selection often grounded on the 
notions of bias and stereotypes.35  And, finally, attorneys may be sanctioned for 
expression that is protected by the First Amendment.36 
In preparation for the House of Delegates meeting, the SCEPR filed a revised 
version of Resolution 109 and its accompanying report on August 3, 2016,37 
addressing or responding to several of the opponents’ concerns.  In response to 
arguments concerning the necessity of Resolution 109, the SCEPR noted that 
twenty-five jurisdictions had already concluded that Model Rule 8.4(d) and the 
preexisting Comment 3 were insufficient to protect against bias, prejudice and 
harassment in the legal profession and had therefore adopted anti-discrimination 
and/or anti-harassment provisions into the black letter of their rules of 
professional conduct.38  It further noted that only thirteen jurisdictions addressed 
 
 34.  Sarah C. Haan & Dominic Lovotti, Eliminating Bias, Harassment, and Discrimination in the Legal 
Profession: Proposed Changes to Model Rule 8.4, 59 ADVOCATE 23, 24 (2016). 
 35.  See Email from Steven A. Weiss, Chair, ABA Section of Litigation, to Myles V. Lynk, Chair, 
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (Jun. 20, 2016, 12:04 CST), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_model
_rule%208_4_comments/aba_section_of_litigation_comment.authcheckdam.pdf (referencing and 
enclosing prior letters expressing concern regarding the interplay between jury selection and the 
proposed change to the model rule). 
 36.  See Eugene Volokh, A Speech Code for Lawyers, Banning Viewpoints that Express “Bias,” Including 
in Law-Related Social Activities, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/10/a-speech-code-for-lawyers-banning-viewpoints-that-
express-bias-including-in-law-related-social-activities-2/?utm_term=.05fb9926c273 (“So say that some 
lawyers put on a Continuing Legal Education event that included a debate on same-sex marriage, or 
on whether there should be limits on immigration from Muslim countries, or on whether people should 
be allowed to use the bathrooms that correspond to their gender identify rather than their biological 
sex.  In the process, unsurprisingly, the debater on one side said something that was critical of gays, 
Muslims or transgender people.  If the rule is adopted, the debater could well be disciplined by the 
state bar.”); Letter from First Liberty to Patricia Lee Refo, Chair, ABA House of Delegates 1 (Aug. 5, 
2016), https://www.scribd.com/document/320478002/Aba-8-4-Ltr-Em-ks (stating that the proposed 
change to Model Rule 8.4 “is a clear and extraordinary threat to free speech and religious liberty, and 
if adopted with the force of law by any bar, would be an unprecedented violation of the First 
Amendment”).  Relatedly, opponents raised the concern that religious organizations or attorneys 
affiliated with religious organizations will not be able to be selective about clientele or hiring practices.  
See Letter from Office of the General Counsel, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, to 
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 7-8 (Mar. 10, 
2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba /administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_ 
model_rule%208_4_comments/moses_3_11_16.authcheckdam.pdf (arguing that the proposed text of 
the Model Rule should make plain that the “rule against discrimination based on religion does not 
apply to lawyers employed by or representing a religious organization . . . [or] where application of 
the rule would impede the organization’s right to adopt and enforce religiously-based employee 
conduct standards”). 
 37.  See Revised Resolution 109 Adopted by ABA HOD, AMER. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar. 
org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility
/modruleprofconduct8_4.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 38.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 5 (citing CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2-400 (2015); 
COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2016); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-8.4(d) (2017); 
IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(a) (2014); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(j) (2016); IND. 
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the issue by adopting the existing Comment 3 into their rules39; while fourteen 
jurisdictions do not address the issue in their rules at all.40  The SCEPR argued that 
Resolution 109 aligned the Model Rules with the anti-discrimination and anti-
harassment provisions present in the black letter of other codes of conduct, 
including the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function.41  It also pointed to 
ample evidence that bias and discrimination is prevalent in the practice of law.42 
The SCEPR added the following language in the black letter rule to address 
concerns regarding a lawyer’s ability to make decisions as to whether or not to 
take on a particular case or client: “This paragraph does not limit the ability of a 
lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in accordance with 
Rule 1.16.”43  It also added the following language to Comment 5 of the rule: “A 
lawyer does not violate paragraph (g) by limiting the scope or subject matter of 
the lawyer’s practice”44; and “[a] lawyer may charge and collect reasonable fees 
and expenses for a representation.”45  To address concerns that lawyers would be 
unable to vigorously represent their clients or would be required to reject clients 
with unpopular views or controversial positions, the SCEPR added the following 
language: “This paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy 
 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2016); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2012); MD. 
LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(e) (2016); MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(i) (2016); 
MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.5 (2015); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g), (h) (2015); MO. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-8.4(g) (2012); NEB. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (2008); N.J. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2015); N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 16-300 (2016); N.Y. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2013); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(f) (2006); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2016); OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a)(7) (2015); R.I. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (2007); TEX. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.08 (2016); VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 8.4(g) (2009); WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2015); WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(i) 
(2017); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 9.1) (2017)). 
 39.  Id. at 5-6 (citing ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. (2004); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2014); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4, commentary (2007); DEL. 
LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2010); IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 
(2014); ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2014); N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 5 
(2003); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2017); S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 
(2004); TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2011); UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 
3 (2015); W. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2015); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 
cmt. 3) (2014)). 
 40.  Id. at 6 (noting that Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Virginia do not address 
the issues of bias, discrimination or harassment in their rules of professional conduct). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. (highlighting a 2015 survey by the Florida Bar’s Young Lawyer’s Division of its female 
members where 43 percent of respondents reported experiencing gender bias and 17 percent reported 
experiencing harassment in their career (citing THE FLORIDA BAR, RESULTS OF THE 2015 YLD SURVEY ON 
WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 9 (2015)). 
 43.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also AMER. BAR ASS’N, 
supra note 7, at 14. 
 44.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 45.  Id. at r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (citing Model Rule 1.5(a)). 
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consistent with these Rules.”46  It also included the following language to 
Comment 5 of the rule: “A lawyer’s representation of a client does not constitute 
an endorsement by the lawyer of the client’s views or activities.”47  Responding to 
concerns regarding jury selection, the SCEPR inserted the following language into 
Comment 5 of the rule (commonly referred to as the “Batson Sentence”48): “A trial 
judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory 
basis does not alone establish a violation of paragraph (g).”49  And, finally, in 
response to concerns of overreach and violations of protected speech or religious 
liberty, the SCEPR stated: 
Proposed new paragraph (g) to Rule 8.4 is a reasonable, limited and necessary 
addition to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  It will make it clear that it is 
professional misconduct to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know constitutes harassment or discrimination while engaged in conduct 
related to the practice of law.  And as has already been shown in the jurisdictions 
that have such a rule, it will not impose an undue burden on lawyers.50 
During the House of Delegates meeting, there were no speakers in 
opposition, and 69 delegates indicated their desire to speak in favor of the 
resolution.51  On a final voice vote, Resolution 109 passed.52  It is now in the hands 
of the states to determine whether to adopt Model Rule 8.4(g) and its 
accompanying comments or to modify their existing rules of professional conduct 
in response to this change. 
II. BIAS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION & THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
Though the effort to revise Model Rule 8.4 began over two years prior to 
approval, Resolution 109 was submitted to the ABA House of Delegates during a 
turbulent time in our country’s history.  With society fractured over issues such as 
women’s rights, minority rights, immigrant rights and LGBTQ rights, a spotlight 
has been placed on the concepts of bias and discrimination.53  Our legal system 
 
 46.  Id. at r. 8.4(g); see also AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 14. 
 47.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (citing Model Rule 
1.2(b)); see also AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 14. 
 48.  See Peter Geraghty, ABA Adopts New Anti-Discrimination Rule 8.4(g), YOUR ABA, (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/youraba/2016/september-2016/aba-adopts-anti-
discrimination-rule-8-4-g—at-annual-meeting-in-.html (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
 49.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also AMER. BAR 
ASS’N, supra note 7, at 15. 
 50.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 15. 
 51.  During the House of Delegates meeting to consider Resolution 109, Patricia Lee Refo, Chair 
of the House of Delegates, announced that 69 salmon slips were submitted to the House of Delegates 
in favor of Resolution 109, and no salmon slips were submitted in opposition.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra 
note 22, at 23:15-23:35.  A salmon slip is “[a] simple, salmon-colored form, indicating that [a member 
of the House of Delegates] wish[es] to speak for or against a resolution.”  AMER. BAR ASS’N, QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS FOR THE NEW MEMBERS OF THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2011). 
 52.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 22, at 26:21-26:32; see also Laird, supra note 31. 
 53.  See e.g., Emma Brown, Yale Study Suggests Racial Bias Among Preschool Teachers, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/09/27/yale-study-
suggests-racial-bias-among-preschool-teachers/?utm_term=.bfaf2cc2b819; Susan Chira & Jonathan 
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likewise faces scrutiny with claims of prevalent bias and discrimination – both in 
the courtroom and within the make-up of the profession itself. 
A. Bias in the Courtroom 
On October 11, 2016, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument 
in the case of Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado54, which garnered media attention to racial 
bias in jury deliberations.55  Peña-Rodriguez, a horse trainer at a racetrack in 
Colorado, was arrested and charged with one felony count and three 
misdemeanor counts of sexual assault or contact and harassment of two teenage 
sisters, daughters of a jockey, who testified that he groped them in a restroom at a 
barn.56  At trial, the prosecution’s case rested on the victims’ identification of Peña-
Rodriguez.57  The defense noted the short time the victims saw their attacker and 
the suggestibility of the identification procedures as the victims identified Peña-
Rodriguez through the window of a police cruiser at night on the roadside where 
 
Martin, After Success of Women’s March, a Question Remains: What’s Next?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/us/after-success-of-womens-march-a-question-remains-whats-
next.html; Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Same-Sex Couples Are Rushing to Say Their Vows. Just in Case . . ., 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/fashion/weddings/same-sex-marriage-
gay-couples-donald-trump.html; Christine Hauser, Black Doctor Says Delta Flight Attendant Rejected Her; 
Sought ‘Actual Physician,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/us/black-
doctor-says-delta-flight-attendant-brushed-her-aside-in-search-of-an-actual-physician.html?_r=0; Eric 
Lichtblau, Hate Crimes Against American Muslims Most Since Post-9/11 Era, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/us/politics/hate-crimes-american-muslims-rise.html; Adam 
Liptak, Supreme Court to Rule in Transgender Access Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/us/politics/supreme-court-to-rule-in-transgender-access-
case.html; Wesley Lowery & Sarah Kaplan, Black Lives Matter: What’s Next, WASH. POST (July 22, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/07/22/blm-whats-
next/?utm_term=.1b9b3a4d22ce; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Matt Apuzzo, Justice 
Department to Release Blistering Report of Racial Bias by Baltimore Police, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/us/justice-department-to-release-blistering-report-of-racial-
bias-by-baltimore-police.html; John A. Powell, Implicit Bias in The Presidential Debate, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-a-powell/implicit-bias-in-thepres_b_12226968. 
html; Liz Robbins, Even Before Trump Acts on Immigration, New Yorkers Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/nyregion/new-york-protest-trump-immigration-orders.html; 
Michael Schwitrz et al., The Scourge of Racial Bias in New York State’s Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/nyregion/new-york-state-prisons-inmates-racial-bias.html. 
 54.  Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
 55.  See Jess Braven, Supreme Court Weighs Juror Racial Bias Against Candid Deliberations, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-weighs-juror-racial-bias-against-candid-
deliberations-1476228224; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Weighs Bias and Secrecy in Jury Deliberations, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/us/politics/supreme-court-bias-jury-
deliberations.html; Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Hears Case on Racial Bias in Jury Deliberations, NPR 
(Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/11/497196091/top-court-hears-case-on-racial-bias-in-jury-
deliberations; see also Turner v. Stime, 222 P.3d 1243, 1249 (Wash. App. 2009) (affirming the grant of a 
new trial on the grounds that the jury had engaged in misconduct by making explicitly biased 
comments about the Asian American attorney representing the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice suit). 
 56.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No. 
15-606). 
 57.  Id. at 3. 
MACRO FINAL Keith (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  6:55 PM 
CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN A POST-MODEL RULE 8.4(G) WORLD  11 
he was detained.58  The defense also presented an alibi witness, who testified that 
Peña-Rodriguez was with him in a different barn when the attack occurred.59  
Though the jurors initially deadlocked, the judge sent them back into 
deliberations, informing them that it was their duty to reach a verdict.60  After 
twelve hours of deliberation, the jurors found Peña-Rodriguez guilty on the three 
misdemeanor charges.61 
After the verdict, defense counsel, consistent with the practice in Colorado 
and other jurisdictions, spoke to two jurors who revealed that during deliberations 
another juror expressed bias toward Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness because 
they are Hispanic.62  With the trial judge’s permission, defense counsel procured 
affidavits from the jurors, in which they alleged that Juror H.C. stated that he knew 
the defendant was guilty “because he’s Mexican” and because in Juror H.C.’s 
experience as an ex-policeman, “nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of 
being aggressive toward women and young girls.”63  The jurors further alleged 
that Juror H.C. stated that “the alibi witness [wasn’t] credible because, among 
other things, he was ‘an illegal.’”64 
During oral argument, Jeffrey Fisher, Peña-Rodriguez’s attorney, argued that 
racial bias “is a stain on the entire judicial system and the integrity that it’s built 
upon.”65  Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed, stating, “I always thought the most 
pernicious and odious discrimination in our law is based on race.”66  Justice Elena 
Kagan, referring to precedents concerning jury selection and race, said “there need 
to be special rules to address this prevalent and toxic problem in our criminal 
justice system. . . .”67 
Justice Kagan’s comments68 appear to refer in part to Foster v. Chatman69, a 
case term in which the Supreme Court in a 7-1 decision recently ruled in favor of 
a death row inmate in a case concerning racial discrimination in jury selection.  
Foster, a poor, black teenager with limited mental abilities was found guilty of 
murder by an all-white jury and spent thirty years on death row.70  The State used 
 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 4. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 4-5. 
 64.  Id. at 5. 
 65.  Oral Argument Transcript at 14, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colo., No. 15-606, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15-606_5iel.pdf. 
 66.  Id. at 6. 
 67.  Id. at 44. 
 68.  Id. (“[I]t seems there are two lines of cases which—in which we’ve recognized that racial bias 
in a jury room is an especially important problem, and that there need to be special rules to address 
that problem. And the first line of cases is the ones that on voir dire say that a lawyer who wants to ask 
about racial bias on voir dire has to be able to ask about racial bias, and that we’ve applied to nothing 
else except for racial bias. And the second is the Batson line of cases where we’ve said we’re going to 
prevent lawyers from doing what we otherwise allow them to do when striking jurors will lead to—
may lead to race bias in the jury room.”). 
 69.  Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016). 
 70.  Id. at 1743. 
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peremptory challenges to strike all prospective black jurors.71  The Court held that 
the State’s justifications were pre-textual—the reasons for striking two black jurors 
had equally applied to non-black jurors, who were not struck, tending to provide 
compelling evidence of “purposeful discrimination.”72  It further held that the 
State’s arguments were contradicted by evidence in the record.73  A copy of the 
prosecutors’ files contained, among other documents: (i) a venire list on which all 
prospective black jurors’ names were highlighted with a legend indicating that 
they “represent[ed] Blacks”; (ii) notes identifying prospective black jurors as “B# 
1,” “B# 2,” etc., and with the notation “N” (for “no”) next to each name; (iii) a list 
titled “definite NO’s” containing six names, including all five prospective black 
jurors; (iv) a document entitled “Church of Christ” with a notation that read “NO.  
No Black Church”; and (v) jury questionnaires by the prospective black jurors on 
which their race had been circled.74  “[T]he shifting explanations, the 
misrepresentations of the record, and the persistent focus on race in the 
prosecution’s file” established that the strikes of the prospective black jurors “were 
motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.”75 
But the issue of bias in jury selection has not only arisen with respect to race 
or ethnicity or in the context of the criminal justice system.  In SmithKline Beecham 
Corporation v. Abbott Laboratories, for example, the Ninth Circuit recently held in an 
antitrust action involving the licensing and pricing of HIV medications that 
peremptory strikes on the basis of sexual orientation during jury selection violate 
equal protection.76  During jury selection, Abbott Laboratories used its first 
peremptory strike against the only self-identified gay prospective member of the 
jury.77  The prospective juror referred to his partner three times by the masculine 
pronoun “he” during voir dire and revealed that he had friends with HIV.78  
Abbott Laboratories’ counsel briefly asked the prospective juror five questions 
about the drug at issue, but did not ask any questions as to whether he could 
decide the case fairly and impartially.79  Abbott Laboratories’ counsel did not 
provide any justification for his strike when given the opportunity, which 
provided a strong inference of intentional discrimination, and his subsequent 
justification was found by the court to not be supported by the record and not 
credible.80 
 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 1754. 
 73.  Id. at 1755. 
 74.  Id. at 1743–44. 
 75.  Id. at 1754 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76.  SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014); see also J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (holding in a paternity and child support action that equal 
protection forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender, particularly where “the 
discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overboard stereotypes about the 
relative abilities of men and women.”). 
 77.  SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 474. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 474–75. 
 80.  Id. at 477–78. 
MACRO FINAL Keith (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  6:55 PM 
CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN A POST-MODEL RULE 8.4(G) WORLD  13 
The above examples illustrate explicit bias in the courtroom; but studies and 
recent cases reveal that our courtroom is likewise rife with implicit bias.81  
Leveraging the Implicit Association Test methodology created by Project Implicit, 
a non-profit organization founded in 1998 by three scientists interested in implicit 
social cognition,82 researchers tested whether law students harbor implicit gender 
biases related to legal careers and to leadership positions in the legal setting.83  The 
study found that law students hold implicit associations correlating men and 
judges and women and paralegals as well as associating men with the workplace 
and women with the home and family.84  Studies further confirm gender bias 
surrounding courtroom decorum, style and persona85; while others highlight 
entrenched gender stereotypes, such as being mistaken for a secretary or paralegal, 
 
 81.  “[I]mplicit bias is grounded in a basic human tendency to divide the social world into groups. 
In other words, what may appear as an example of tacit racism may actually be a manifestation of a 
broader propensity to think in terms of ‘us versus them’ — a prejudice that can apply, say, to fans of a 
different sports team.” Daniel A. Yudkin & Jay Van Bavel, The Roots of Implicit Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/opinion/sunday/the-roots-of-implicit-bias.html; see also 
Saleem Reshamwala, Who, Me? Biased?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com 
/video/who-me-biased (describing implicit bias in our society and strategies to de-bias). 
 82.  See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The 
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998); PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (offering thirteen implicit association 
tests on topics such as race, weight, disability, gender, skin-tone, sexuality, mental health and even 
presidential candidates).   
 83.  Justin P. Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical 
Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLICY 1, 3–4 (2010). 
 84.  Id. at 28–29; see also Ed Yong, 6-Year-Old Girls Already Have Gendered Beliefs About Intelligence, 
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/01/six-year-old-girls-
already-have-gendered-beliefs-about-intelligence/514340/?utm_source=fbia (revealing the results of a 
study in which Lin Bian, a University of Illinois psychologist, read a story to children aged five to seven 
about a person who is “really, really smart” and then asked the children to match pictures of four 
unfamiliar adults—two men and two women—to attributes such as “smart” or “nice” and noting that 
“[t]he stereotypes that brilliance and genius are male traits is common among adults. In various 
surveys, men rate their intelligence more favorably than women, and in a recent study of biology 
undergraduates, men overrated the abilities of male students above equally talented and outspoken 
women. But Bian’s study shows that the seeds of this pernicious bias are planted at a very early age. 
Even by the age of 6, boys and girls are already diverging in who they think is smart.”). 
 85.  See DEF. RESEARCH INST., A CAREER IN THE COURTROOM: A DIFFERENT MODEL FOR THE SUCCESS 
OF WOMEN WHO TRY CASES, 10–11 (2004) (revealing in a survey of the judiciary that several judges 
viewed women who raised their voice in the courtroom as “shrill,” while men were viewed as simply 
being aggressive, and noting that judges identified one of their biggest challenges was dealing with 
entrenched biases against women when they exhibit aggressive behavior); Peter W. Hahn & Susan D. 
Clayton, The Effects of Attorney Presentation Style, Attorney Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20 
LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 533, 549 (1996) (examining the effects of aggressive versus passive speech 
and finding that women were less successful than men when adopting an aggressive demeanor in 
securing a “not guilty” verdict from mock jurors for their client); see also Deborah L. Rhode & Barbara 
Kellerman, Women and Leadership: The State of Play, in WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP: THE STATE OF PLAY AND 
STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 1 (Barbara Kellerman & Deborah L. Rhodes eds., 2006) (noting that female 
litigators must strike a balance between societal stereotypes regarding feminine and masculine traits 
in order to be perceived favorably in the courtroom; for example, if she is soft-spoken and 
compassionate, she may be perceived as weak, but if she is too forceful or aggressive, she may be 
labeled as abrasive).  
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being called a “term of endearment,” or being treated in a condescending 
manner.86 
With respect to implicit bias on the basis of race or ethnicity, another study 
revealed that potential jurors implicitly associate white males with traits 
commonly used to depict successful litigators, such as eloquent, charismatic, and 
verbal.87  The study examined whether bias (explicit or implicit) in favor of white 
lawyers and against Asian American lawyers would alter how people evaluate 
identical lawyering, simply because of the race or ethnicity of the lawyer.88  The 
researchers intentionally did not examine the effect of race or ethnicity for women 
attorneys, noting: 
Our strategy was not to ignore gender, but to control for it, based on past evidence 
showing that lawyers are expected to be men rather than women . . . . As such, we 
expected that implicit and explicit stereotypes about ideal lawyers would activate 
thoughts of White men more than Asian men, but would not much activate 
thoughts of women of either race.89 
Relatedly, the Court of Appeals of Idaho recently held that a prosecutorial 
remark with implicit racial overtones improperly infused race into a criminal trial, 
violating the defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and equal 
protection.90  In State v. Kirk, four white juvenile females ran away from a group 
home and encountered James D. Kirk, an African-American male, outside of a 
motel.91  Kirk invited the girls to spend the night there.92  Later the next day, when 
 
 86.  See DEF. RESEARCH INST., supra note 85, at 10–11 (reporting that 70.4 percent of survey 
participants experienced gender bias in the courtroom); Bibianne Fell, Gender in the Courtroom: Part 1 – 
Is Lady Justice at a Disadvantage in the Courtroom?, NAT’L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOC.: THE LEGAL ADVOCATE 
(Mar. 19, 2013), http://blog.nita.org/2013/03/gender-in-the-courtroom-part-1-is-lady-justice-at-a-
disadvantage-in-the-courtroom/ (highlighting a 2005 survey by the State Bar of California Center for 
Access and Fairness that found that 54 percent of participating female attorneys in California reported 
experiencing gender bias in the courtroom and a 2004 survey by the Texas State Bar reporting that nine 
out of ten participating female attorneys report being the target of at least one incident of gender 
discrimination in the courtroom); see also Kat McFarlane, Motion to Dismiss: From Catcalls to Kisses, 
Gender Bias in the Courtroom, OBSERVER (Jul. 10, 2013), http://observer.com/2013/07/women-lawyers-
sexism-nyc/ (“My adversaries, civil rights attorneys representing plaintiffs in federal court, were 
overwhelmingly male, and they loved to yell at me, both over the phone and in person.  When they 
didn’t like my strategy, they called my motions ‘stupid.’  When I made a cogent argument that I refused 
to back down from, I was ‘too sensitive.’”); Elizabeth Olson, Bar Association Considers Striking “Honeys” 
From the Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 5, 2016) at B1, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/ 
business/dealbook/sexual-harassment-ban-is-on-the-abas-docket.html (“When Lori Rifkin asked the 
opposing lawyer to stop interrupting her while she questioned a potential witness, he replied: ‘Don’t 
raise your voice at me.  It’s not becoming of a woman.’ The remark drew a rebuke and [a $250] fine in 
January [2016] from a federal magistrate who declared that the lawyer had ‘endorsed the stereotype 
that women are subject to a different standard of behavior than their fellow attorneys.’”). 
 87.  Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myths of Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES 886, 902 (2010).   
 88.  Id. at 912.   
 89.  Id. at 893 (internal citations omitted). 
 90.  State v. Kirk, 339 P.3d 1213, 1219 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). 
 91.  Id. at 1214. 
 92.  Id. 
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two of the girls were apprehended by police, they told police that they had had 
sex with Kirk.93  When the other two girls turned themselves in to police a few 
days later, they stated that they observed Kirk and the two girls having sex.94  
When Kirk was arrested, he admitted that the girls had been in his motel room, 
but denied any sexual conduct.95  Kirk was charged with lewd conduct with and 
sexual battery of a minor child.96  At trial, the prosecution’s case relied primarily 
on the girls’ testimony.97  As such, during closing argument, defense counsel 
focused on the weaknesses of the State’s case, namely the lack of physical evidence 
corroborating the girls’ testimony.98  In her rebuttal closing argument, the 
prosecutor sang or recited the lines from “Dixie,” stating: 
Ladies and gentleman, when I was a kid we used to like to sing songs a lot.  I 
always think of this one song.  Some people know it.  It’s the Dixie song.  Right?  
Oh, I wish I was in the land of cotton. Good times not forgotten.  Look away.  Look 
away.  Look away.  And isn’t that really what you’ve kind of been asked to do?  
Look away from the two eyewitnesses.  Look away from the two victims.  Look 
away from the nurse in her medical opinion.  Look away.  Look away.  Look 
away.99 
Defense counsel did not object, and the jury found Kirk guilty on both 
charges.100  On appeal, the court noted that “‘Dixie’ was an anthem of the 
Confederacy, an ode to the Old South, which references with praise a time and 
place of the most pernicious racism.”101  While the court agreed that the 
prosecutor’s comment may have been innocently made and not intended to appeal 
to racial bias, the court stated that “a prosecutor’s mental state, however innocent, 
does not determine the message received by the jurors or their individual 
responses to it. An invocation of race by a prosecutor, even if subtle and oblique, may 
be violative of due process or equal protection.”102 
  
 
 
 
 93.  Id. at 1214–15. 
 94.  Id. at 1215. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 1216. 
 102.  Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 556–58 (Wash. 2011) (finding 
constitutional infringement where the prosecutor appealed to racial stereotypes or racial bias by 
pronouncing several times “police” as “po-leese” while conducting examination of African-American 
witnesses and suggesting that there existed an anti-snitch code among African-Americans); State v. 
Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Minn. 2005) (finding that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
wrongfully accusing defense counsel of asserting a racist defense, stating “[a]ffirming this conviction 
would undermine our strong commitment to rooting out bias, no matter how subtle, indirect, or 
veiled.”). 
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 In February 2017, in another high profile case,103 the Supreme Court, in an 
opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, overturned a death-penalty 
sentence after an expert witness testified that the defendant was likely to commit 
future crimes because of the color of his skin.104 During the sentencing phase of a 
capital murder case, Duane Buck’s attorney called Dr. Walter Quijano, a 
psychologist appointed by the presiding judge to conduct a psychological 
evaluation of Buck, to elaborate on the seven “statistical factors”—one of which 
was “race”—he evaluated to determine whether Buck was likely to commit acts of 
violence in the future.105  Dr. Quijano’s report read, in relevant part: “4. Race.  
Black: Increased probability.  There is an overrepresentation of Blacks among the 
violent offenders.”106  Despite knowing Dr. Quijano’s views regarding a 
correlation between Buck’s race and an increased probability of future violence, 
Buck’s attorney successfully admitted Dr. Quijano’s report into evidence.107 
During cross-examination, the prosecutor likewise focused on the report, 
questioning Dr. Quijano about his statistical factors of sex and race: “‘You have 
determined that the sex factor, that a male is more violent than a female because 
that’s just the way it is, and that the race factor, black, increases the future 
dangerousness for various complicated reasons; is that correct?’  Dr. Quijano 
replied, ‘Yes.’”108  During closing argument, the prosecution stressed this point, 
stating, “You heard from Dr. Quijano, . . . who told you that . . . the probability did 
exist that [Buck] would be a continuing threat to society.”109  After two days of 
deliberations and after requesting to view the “psychology reports” admitted into 
evidence, the jury returned a sentence of death.110 
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that “Dr. Quijano took the stand as a 
medical expert bearing the court’s imprimatur” and rendered an opinion that 
“coincided precisely with a particularly noxious strain of racial prejudice, which 
itself coincided precisely with the central question at sentencing”— would Buck 
commit terrible acts of violence again?111  In answering that question, the jury was 
asked to engage in a speculative inquiry, and Dr. Quijano appeared to present 
“hard statistical evidence” to guide their answer.112 
But one thing would never change: the color of Buck’s skin.  Buck would always 
be black.  And according to Dr. Quijano, that immutable characteristic carried with 
 
 103.  Matt Ford, ‘Some Toxins Can Be Deadly in Small Doses,’ THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2017) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/supreme-court-duane-buck/517542/; Adam 
Liptak, Citing Racist Testimony, Justices Call for New Sentencing in a Death Penalty Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
23, 2017; David Savage, Supreme Court Rejects Use of ‘Racial Stereotypes’ in Death Penalty Cases, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-
supreme-court-rejects-use-of-racial-1487777756-htmlstory.html.  
 104.  Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 767 (2017). 
 105.  Id. at 768. 
 106.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 107.  Id. at 768–69. 
 108.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 109.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 776–77. 
 112.  Id. at 776. 
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it an “[i]ncreased probability” of future violence. . . . And it was potent evidence.  
Dr. Quijano’s testimony appealed to a powerful racial stereotype—that of black 
men as “violence prone.”113 
In holding that Buck demonstrated both ineffective assistance of counsel and 
entitlement to a reopening of the judgment, the Court noted that “Dr. Quijano’s 
report said, in effect, that the color of Buck’s skin made him more deserving of 
execution,” and “[n]o competent defense attorney would introduce such evidence 
about his own client.”114  Moreover, in acknowledging the dangers of implicit bias 
in the judicial system, the Court stated that “[i]t would be patently 
unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to be a future danger 
because of his race.”115 
B. Bias in the Legal Profession 
As Wendi S. Lazar, Chair of the ABA Commission on Women in the 
Profession, stated during her presentation on Resolution 109 before the House of 
Delegates: 
[In] our profession, our record [of supporting women and minorities] is . . . 
abysmal.  We have few women equity partners, and fewer minority partners. And 
in terms of diversity and inclusion, our record is poor.  We are losing the war on 
retention, allowing women and minorities to leave the profession because they feel 
unprotected and undervalued.116 
Despite the fact that women have comprised almost half of the law school 
graduating class for approximately 20 years,117 women currently represent only 36 
percent of the legal profession.118  Relatedly, within private practice law firms, “the 
representation of women, after making steady incremental progress post-
recession, has essentially stalled. . . .”119  In 2015, though women comprised 48 
percent of law firm summer associate classes, the percentage of women among the 
associate ranks now sits at roughly 45 percent, the lowest level since 2006.120  
Though a small gain over prior years, women now represent just over 21 percent 
 
 113.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 114.  Id. at 775. 
 115.  Id.; see also Arusha Gordon, Sentenced to Death for Being Black? A Look at Buck v. Davis, 
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.afj.org/blog/sentenced-to-death-for-being-black-a-
look-at-buck-v-davis (noting that the amicus brief filed by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law and international law firm Jones Day in support of Buck “provides a summary of research 
on implicit bias and argues that unconscious stereotypes can be brought to the fore by exposure to 
racially-tinged triggers, a process known as ‘priming.’  In addition, the brief argues that, because we 
are psychologically geared to give greater credence to authority figures, implicit biases and priming 
have a particularly profound impact when invoked by an expert witness.”).  
 116.  House of Delegates: Rule Against Harassment and Discrimination, supra note 22, at 18:24-18:50. 
 117.  NALP Diversity Infographic: Women, NALP (citing NALP, 2015-2016 NALP DIRECTORY OF 
LEGAL EMPLOYERS (2016)), http://www.nalp.org/nalpdiversityinfographic_women (last visited Feb. 25, 
2017). 
 118.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS YEAR 2016 (2016) (citing AMER. BAR ASS’N, 2016 
NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY (2016)). 
 119.  NALP Diversity Infographic: Women, supra note 117. 
 120.  Id.  
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of law firm partners.121  Similarly, women represent just shy of 25 percent of 
general counsels at Fortune 500 companies.122  Among non-equity law firm 
partners, women represent almost 29 percent; however, only 17.4 percent of equity 
partners are women,123 and women represent only roughly 5.5 percent of law firm 
managing partners in the AmLaw 200, the largest law firms in the country.124   
According to the National Association of Women Lawyers’ (NAWL) Ninth 
Annual Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms: 
Men continue to be promoted to non-equity partner status in significantly higher 
numbers than women.  Among the non-equity partners who graduated from law 
school in 2004 and later, 38 percent were women and 62 percent were men.  This 
data remain vexing in light of the longstanding pipeline of women, as women have 
been graduating from law school in nearly equal numbers for decades.125 
Moreover, the gender gap at the leadership levels is striking.  “[R]oughly one 
in five firms still has no woman on their top governing committee.”126  And, of 
those firms with female representation on their governance committees, women 
typically comprise only 22 percent of committee members.127 
“At the root of retention and advancement disparities, say experts, is the 
subtle bias that plays out in compensation decisions.”128  And, it appears that for 
women the compensation gender gap is widening.  In response to NAWL’s Ninth 
Annual Survey, not a single responding law firm reported having a woman as its 
highest earner.129  Rather, the data reflects that female equity partners typically 
earn 80 percent of what their male counterparts earn130 and that men continue to 
 
 121.  Id.; see also Julie Triedman, A Few Good Women, AM. LAWYER, Jun. 2015, at 41 (“As more firms 
expand their nonequity tier, women appear to be getting stuck in what some people call a ‘pink ghetto.’ 
That’s a major problem: On average, nonequity or income partners may expect to make a third what 
their equity-tier peers are earning; leadership positions are generally not within their grasp.”). 
 122.  See Lydia Lum, Breaking Barriers, One Person at a Time: MCCA’s 17th Annual General Counsel 
Survey, DIVERSITY & THE BAR, Nov./Dec. 2016, at 21 (highlighting the increase of four female general 
counsels over the prior year and noting that Jean Lee, MCCA’s president and CEO “considers any 
growth–even at a modest pace–positive, but pointed out that because women make up more than one-
third of the legal profession, there should be no shortage of female job candidates”). 
 123.  NALP Diversity Infographic: Women, supra note 117. 
 124.  Triedman, supra note 121, at 46; see also Lauren Stiller Rikleen, Women Lawyers Continue to Lag 
Behind Male Colleagues: Report of the Ninth Annual NAWL National Survey on Retention and Promotion of 
Women in Law Firms, NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, at 10 (2015) (“Of the 25 firms that reported 
having a single managing partner, 82 percent were men and only 18 percent were women.”); Jake 
Simpson, Only 12 BigLaw Firms Have Women Running the Show, LAW360, Apr. 21, 2015, 
http://www.law360.com/articles/645840/only-12-biglaw-firms-have-women-running-the-show (“Of 
the 143 firmwide chair and managing partner positions at the top 100 firms in the Law360 400, only 15 
are held by women.”). 
 125.  NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 3. 
 126.  Triedman, supra note 121, at 38. 
 127.  NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 10. 
 128.  Triedman, supra note 121, at 41. 
 129.  NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 3. 
 130.  Id. at 3; see also Triedman, supra note 121, at 41 (“[A]ccording to a survey of more than 2,000 
large law firm partners last year by Major, Lindsey & Africa, compensation for male partners was 32 
percent higher than that of their female colleagues.”). 
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outpace women in client origination or rainmaking credit131 and billable rates.132  
Furthermore, as articulated in an empirical study of the participation of women as 
lead counsel and trial attorneys in civil and criminal litigation, “women are 
consistently underrepresented in lead counsel positions and in the role of trial 
attorney for all but a few types of cases.”133 
The statistics are far worse when looking at racial and ethnic bias.  According 
to the 2010 Census, the most recent statistics on racial and ethnic demographics, 
the legal profession is homogenous, with 88 percent of lawyers identifying as 
White, 5 percent identifying as Black, 4 percent as Hispanic, 3 percent as Asian 
Pacific American and less than one percent identifying as all other races or 
ethnicities.134 
Despite the fact that minorities comprised almost 27 percent of law school 
graduates in the class of 2014, minorities are less likely to be employed full-time 
after graduation than non-minorities and the representation of minorities among 
lawyers at large law firms in 2015 was less than 14 percent.135  On a positive note, 
though, minority representation among the law firm summer associate ranks is 
fairly favorable with minorities comprising 31 percent of summer associates in 
2015.  Minorities now comprise roughly 22 percent of associates at large law firms, 
which is largely attributable to an increase in the number of lawyers of Asian 
descent, who now make up nearly 11 percent of all law firm associates.136  
Representation of African-American associates has declined steadily since 2010, 
leading to associates of Hispanic origin to slightly outnumber African-American  
 
 
 131.  NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 7–9 (noting that among the responding 
law firms, 88 percent of the top ten earners were men and 12 percent were women); see also Jennifer 
Smith, Female Lawyers Still Battle Gender Bias, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2014), http://www.wsj.com 
/articles/SB10001424052702303948104579537814028747376 (“[T]he problem often occurs . . . among 
female partners who may bill thousands of hours a year but aren’t regarded as rainmakers—even if 
their skill, time and energy has helped land a client or significantly expanded that relationship. ‘They 
are not getting the credit for what they do,’ [Patricia K. Gillette] said, or opportunities to inherit big 
clients, which at some firms she said ‘tend to get handed down to men.’”). 
 132.  Smith, supra note 131 (“[F]emale law-firm partners continue to lag behind their male 
counterparts when it comes to billing rates, commanding on average 10% less for their services, 
according to a new analysis of $3.4 billion in legal work.”). 
 133.  Michele Coleman Mayes, First Chairs at Trial: More Women Need Seats at the Table, AMER. BAR 
FOUND. & AMER. BAR ASS’N COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., at 4 (2015); see id. at 13-14 (finding 
that (i) “[i]n civil cases, men are three times more likely to appear in lead roles than women,” (ii) 
“women are more likely to be lead counsel representing civil defendants rather than civil plaintiffs,” 
and (iii) “only a minority of attorneys appearing in criminal cases are women,” and when they do 
appear, “[w]omen lead counsel in criminal cases represent the government more than twice as often as 
they represent criminal defendants”). 
 134.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 118 (citing 2010 U.S. CENSUS) (noting that the U.S. Census 
considers “Hispanic” an ethnicity, and therefore, persons of Hispanic origin can be of any race). 
 135.  NALP Diversity Infographic: Minorities, NALP (citing NALP, 2015-2016 NALP DIRECTORY OF 
LEGAL EMPLOYERS (2016)), http://www.nalp.org/nalpdiversityinfographic_minorities (noting that of 
the 31 percent of minority summer associates, “17 percent are minority women and 14 percent are 
minority men”). 
 136.  Id. 
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associates at 4.28 percent.137 Minorities represent only 7.52 percent of large law 
firm partners with minority women representing only 2.5 percent.138  Among non-
equity law firm partners, minorities represent almost 9.5 percent; however, just 
over 5.5 percent of equity partners are minorities.139 
According to NAWL’s Ninth Annual Survey: 
The typical firm has 105 white male equity partners and seven minority male 
equity partners, and 20 white female equity partners and two minority female 
equity partners. Women comprise only 24 percent of Hispanic equity partners, 33 
percent of black equity partners, and 29 percent of Asian equity partners. So few 
Native American and Asian Pacific equity partners were identified that the 
median reported for both men and women was zero.140 
Moreover, “minorities still represent a tiny percentage of Fortune 500 
leaders.”141  According to the Minority Corporate Counsel Association’s 17th 
Annual General Counsel Survey, minorities represent just over 11 percent of 
general counsels, with women of color representing just 4.4 percent.142  “Women 
of color are scarce every year in the MCCA General Counsel Survey.  Typically, three 
or fewer are newcomer GCs at Fortune® 500 employers, resulting in glaring 
disparities between these women and their nonminority peers.  Nothing indicates 
the 5-to-1 gap in hiring, promotion and representation will disappear soon.”143 
As a means of understanding bias and inequity in the workplace, the ABA 
Commission on Women in the Profession, through its Women of Color Research 
Initiative, surveyed more than 1,000 current and former Fortune 500 in-house 
attorneys of both genders and all racial and ethnic backgrounds.144  The survey 
responses confirmed that “female attorneys of color in the corporate sector face 
many of the same issues and obstacles as their women of color counterparts in law 
firms, including the negative impact of bias and stereotypes on their careers.”145  
When asked to rate the level of bias they experienced in their careers, 26 percent 
of respondents “[e]xperienced demeaning comments or other types of 
harassment” on the basis of gender, while approximately 9 percent experienced 
such behavior on the basis of race or ethnicity.146  Respondents reacted similarly to 
questions on whether they (i) “[e]xperienced one or more forms of discrimination” 
(26 percent on the basis of gender and 10 percent on the basis of race or ethnicity), 
 
 137.  Id. (noting that Hispanic representation among law firm associate ranks has increased only by 
one half of one percent since 2009). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 6. 
 141.  Thomas Threlkeld, Measuring the Progress of the Nation’s Legal Leaders: MCCA’s 13th Annual 
General Counsel Survey, DIVERSITY & THE BAR, Sept./Oct. 2012, at 30. 
 142.  Lum, supra note 122, at 20 (noting that the roster of the 56 minority general counsel consists 
of 34 men and 22 women, and is racially comprised of 28 African-Americans, 13 Hispanic Americans 
and 15 Asian-Pacific Americans, one of whom is South Asian).  
 143.  Id. at 16. 
 144.  ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN FORTUNE 
500 LEGAL DEPARTMENTS VI (2012). 
 145.  Id. at VII. 
 146.  Id. at XI (Table I). 
MACRO FINAL Keith (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  6:55 PM 
CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN A POST-MODEL RULE 8.4(G) WORLD  21 
(ii) were treated differently than their peers (24 percent on the basis of gender and 
9 percent on the basis of race or ethnicity) and (iii) lacked access to informal or 
formal networking opportunities (27 percent on the basis of gender and 9 percent 
on the basis of race or ethnicity).147  With respect to opportunities for advancement, 
19 percent of respondents noted that they were denied promotion or advancement 
and/or missed out on desirable assignments on the basis of gender, while 7 percent 
were denied an advancement opportunity and 6 percent failed to receive ideal 
assignments on account of their race or ethnicity.148 
Relatedly, in a study by a leadership consulting firm, sixty lawyers from 
twenty-two law firms were shown the same research memorandum allegedly 
from a third-year law student (in actuality, it was written with the help of five law 
firm partners).149  Half of the lawyers were told that the memorandum was written 
by an African-American male student, while the other half were informed that the 
writer was a Caucasian male.150  When scoring the memorandum on a five point 
scale, the lawyers awarded the Caucasian writer a score of 4.1, while the African-
American writer was awarded a score of 3.2.151  Moreover, when providing 
comments, “[t]he white [student] was praised for his potential and good analytical 
skills, while the black [student] was criticized as average at best and needing a lot 
of work.”152 
According to NALP, compared with the general population, our legal 
profession boasts very few lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) lawyers.  
In 2014, NALP collected for the first time data on the sexual orientation of law 
school graduates, garnering a 38 percent response rate.153  Of those self-reporting 
their sexual orientation, only 4 percent identified as lesbian, gay or bisexual (the 
number of law school graduates identifying as transgender was too nominal to 
evaluate separately).154  “Of these graduates, more than half were male” and only 
a fourth were lawyers of color.155  Within large law firms, 5 percent of the 2014 
 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See Debra Cassens Weiss, Partners in Study Gave Legal Memo a Lower Rating When Told Author 
Wasn’t White, ABA J. (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/hypothetical_ 
legal_memo_demonstrates_unconscious_biases. 
 150.  See id. 
 151.  See id. 
 152.  Id.; see also Dolly Chugh et al., Professors Are Prejudiced, Too, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/opinion/sunday/professors-are-prejudiced-too.html (revealing 
the results of a study through which identical emails, “written in impeccable English, varying only the 
name of the student sender,” were sent to 6,500 randomly selected professors from 259 American 
universities from a fictional prospective student seeking guidance about the university’s Ph.D. 
program, and finding that by sending the messages “from students with names like Meredith Roberts, 
Lamar Washington, Juanita Martinez, Raj Singh and Chang Huang, names that earlier research 
participants consistently perceived as belonging to either a white, black, Hispanic, Indian or Chinese 
student,” “[p]rofessors were more responsive to white male students than to female, black, Hispanic, 
Indian or Chinese students in almost every discipline and across all types of universities”).  
 153.  NALP Diversity Infographic: LGBT, NALP, http://www.nalp.org/nalpdiversityinfographic_lgbt 
(citing NALP, 2015-2016 NALP DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS (2016)). 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
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summer associate class identified as LGBT,156 and LGBT lawyers comprise only 2 
percent of large law firm equity partners.157  At law firms of 100 or fewer attorneys, 
LGBT representation in the partnership ranks has notably increased from 0.63 
percent in 2009 to over 2 percent in 2015.158  However, within corporations, 
representation of LGBT lawyers is unclear as the Minority Corporate Counsel 
Association has yet to include LGBT individuals as part of its annual general 
counsel survey.159 
Similarly, less than 2 percent of law school graduates self-identified as having 
a disability.160  Graduates with a disability are the least likely to be employed 
following graduation as compared to men, women, minorities or graduates 
identifying as lesbian, gay or bisexual.161  Within large law firms, individuals with 
disabilities account for just over 0.39 percent of associates and 0.30 percent of 
partners.162 
III. THE REASONABLE CULTURALLY COMPETENT LAWYER 
During the comment period for Resolution 109, the SCEPR received 
substantial comment regarding the lack of a mens rea standard within the initially 
proposed language.163  As a result, the SCEPR revised the final language of the 
rule, making it professional misconduct if a lawyer engages in conduct that the 
 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 6 (“According to the data provided 
by 56 firms, only 2 percent of female and 1 percent of male equity partners are LGBT.”); see also J. Dalton 
Courson, Reality Check: Combating Implicit Bias, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION LGBT LITIGATOR (Dec. 21, 
2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/lgbt/articles/fall2012-1212-reality-check-
combating-implicit-bias.html (“Over the course of a career, the effects of implicit decision-making can 
lead to significant, detrimental consequences for the careers of LGBT lawyers. For example, in a law-
firm setting, straight partners handing out choice assignments may subconsciously feel more 
comfortable working with straight associates and thus seek their assistance first, leading to fewer 
billable hours and less challenging work for LGBT lawyers. Because LGBT attorneys are less likely to 
choose traditional, opposite-sex family arrangements, LGBT lawyers and their straight counterparts 
can have social differences that might reinforce implicit biases in some settings. Or a referral source 
may have a subconscious concern that an LGBT colleague might be perceived negatively by the client 
or in a courtroom, and choose to pass the case along to a straight colleague.”). 
 158.  NALP, supra note 153. 
 159.  Lum, supra note 122, at 27 (noting existing efforts to expand the MCCA’s annual general 
counsel survey in future years to include LGBT general counsel). 
 160.  NALP Diversity Infographic: Disabilities, NALP, http://www.nalp.org/nalpdiversityinfo 
graphic_disabilities (citing NALP, 2015-2016 NALP DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS (2016)); see also 
Mark Hansen, Left Behind: ABA Says Make Disabilities Part of Diversity Mix on Federal Bench, ABA J. (Apr. 
1, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine /article/left_behind_aba_says_make_disabilities_part_ 
of_diversity_mix_on_federal_ben (highlighting that ABA members who identify themselves as having 
a disability dropped from 6.87 percent to 4.56 percent). 
 161.  NALP Diversity Infographic: Disabilities, supra note 159; see also ABA COMM’N ON MENTAL AND 
PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW, ABA DISABILITY STATISTICS REPORT 2 (2011) (noting that in a 2009 NALP 
study law school graduates with disabilities reported earning a mean salary of $84,018 and a median 
salary of $62,973, compared to a mean salary of $93,454 and a median salary of $72,000 for male and 
female graduates of all races and ethnicities). 
 162.  NALP Diversity Infographic: Disabilities, supra note 159. 
 163.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 7. 
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lawyer “knows or reasonably should know” is discrimination or harassment.164  
As both “knows” and “reasonably should know” are defined under Model Rule 
1.0(f)165 and 1.0(j),166 respectively, the SCEPR, in making this revision, argued that 
the rule now incorporates a subjective standard that requires ascertaining the 
lawyer’s actual state of mind (“knows”) and an objective standard that “asks what 
a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would have comprehended from the 
circumstances presented” (“reasonably should know”).167 
Despite the incredible strides made by virtue of Resolution 109, Model Rule 
8.4(g) leaves open a critical issue with respect to implementation.  The SCEPR 
claims that the insertion of the mens rea standard “supports the rule’s focus on 
conduct and resolves concerns of vagueness or uncertainty about what behavior 
is expected of the lawyer.”168  But the rule does not answer whether lawyers are 
obligated to become culturally competent or whether it is simply permissible for 
lawyers to blind themselves to bias and prejudice present in our legal profession 
to avoid being subject to disciplinary action.  In other words, how culturally 
competent is the “reasonable lawyer”? 
A. The Reasonable Lawyer v. The Reasonable Victim 
The “reasonable person” is one of the longest-established creations “among 
the select group of personalities who inhabit our legal village and are available to 
be called upon when a problem arises that needs to be solved objectively.”169  Its 
application though is not without criticism and controversy.170  Throughout its 
history, scholars and the courts have grappled with whether reasonableness 
should be a normative or positive notion,171 whether the reasonable person should 
 
 164.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 165.  Id. at r. 1.0(f) (defining “knows” as “denot[ing] actual knowledge of the fact in question” and 
noting that “[a] person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances”). 
 166.  Id. at r. 1.0(j) (defining “reasonably should know” “when used in reference to a lawyer [as] 
denot[ing] that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in 
question”). 
 167.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 7-8 (emphasis added) (noting the ample precedent for the 
insertion of a mens rea standard, which is currently used in Model Rules 1.13(f), 2.3(b), 2.4(b), 3.6(a), 4.3 
(twice) and 4.4(b)). 
 168.  Id. at 8. 
 169.  Helow v. Advoc. Gen. for Scot., SC 967, 968 (Scot. 2008); see also Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. 
Peirce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the “Reasonable Woman” Standard in Sexual Harassment 
Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 775 (1993) (“[T]he ‘reasonable person’ standard has long been accepted 
by most courts as the correct measure for evaluating allegedly culpable conduct, most notably in 
negligence cases.”). 
 170.  See Michael Vitiello, Defining the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law: Fighting the Lernaean 
Hydra, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1435, 1442-49 (2010) (discussing the controversial and complex nature 
of court decisions as to whether the reasonable person takes on personal characteristics of the defendant 
in criminal law cases); Adler & Peirce, supra note 168, at 775 (highlighting the controversy surrounding 
the applicability of the reasonable person standard to sexual harassment cases). 
 171.  See Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 NYU L. REV. 323, 324 (2012) 
(evaluating whether the reasonable person should be “defined in accordance with a particular 
normative ethical commitment, be it welfare maximization, equal freedom, ethic of care, and so forth, 
or in accordance with an empirically observed practice or perception”). 
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be imbued with the characteristics of the defendant in criminal cases or the 
negligent party in civil cases,172 or whether reasonableness should be evaluated 
through the perspective of the victim.173  With respect to evaluating the 
“reasonable person” standard in the context of attorney discipline under Model 
Rule 8.4(g), the author favors reasonableness as a positive notion–defining the 
reasonable person “in accordance with an empirically observed practice or 
perception”174–and is intrigued by the notion of imbuing characteristics of the 
victim into the evaluation of reasonableness. 
In Professors Robert S. Adler and Ellen R. Peirce’s analysis of the 
development of the “reasonable woman” standard in connection with sexual 
harassment cases, they highlighted a dilemma that is likewise prevalent in 
determining whether an attorney has engaged in harassment or discrimination 
under the rules of professional conduct.  Following the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,175 which aimed to provide clarity surrounding 
the appropriate standard of review for evaluating a “hostile environment” in 
sexual harassment cases, courts were required to assess whether the allegedly 
harassing conduct was “both unwelcome and so severe or pervasive that it altered 
the plaintiff’s working environment.”176  The question arose, however, from whose 
perspective—”that of the particular victim, a reasonable person undifferentiated 
by sex, or a reasonable woman”?177  Just as with discrimination and harassment 
governing attorney conduct, Professors Adler and Peirce noted, “[s]ome see it . . . 
some won’t.”178 
In answering the question, Professors Adler and Peirce point to policy 
guidance issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
emphasizing that when undertaking the hostile environment analysis “the 
harasser’s conduct should be evaluated from the objective standpoint of a 
‘reasonable person’” and that “Title VII should not serve as a ‘vehicle for 
vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive.’”179  The EEOC noted 
 
 172.  See Vitiello, supra note 169, at 1447 (arguing that in self-defense cases “courts have not reached 
consistent positions on drawing the line when faced with a request for an instruction that 
individualizes the reasonable person”); but see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 242 (“But the heredity, 
intelligence or temperament of the actor would not be held material in judging negligence, and could 
not be without depriving the criterion of all its objectivity.”). 
 173.  See Adler & Peirce, supra note 168, at 776 (“While a number of courts adhere to the traditional 
‘reasonable person’ standard, others modify the reasonable person standard through a two-step 
‘subjective/objective’ approach that explicitly considers the perspective both of the victim and of a 
reasonable person.”). 
 174.  Miller & Perry, supra note 170, at 324. 
 175.  Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-68 (1986). 
 176.  Adler & Peirce, supra note 168, at 773-74. 
 177.  Id. at 774. 
 178.  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also id. at 775 (“A male supervisor 
might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell a female subordinate that she has a ‘great 
figure’ or ‘nice legs.’  The female subordinate, however, may find such comments offensive.  Such a 
situation presents a dilemma for both the man and the woman: the man may not realize that his 
comments are offensive, and the woman may be fearful of criticizing her supervisor.”) (citing Lipsett v. 
Uniy. of Puerto Rico, 842 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
 179.  Id. at 774 (quoting U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Policy Guidance on Current Issues 
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though that the reasonable person standard should take into consideration “the 
victim’s perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior.”180  In line 
with this guidance and as a result of research suggesting that men and women 
differ in their judgments of what particular behavior and comments constitute 
sexual harassment, courts across the country have concluded that the differing 
social experiences of men and women warrant the application of a “reasonable 
woman” standard in sexual harassment cases.181 
In advocating for the “reasonable women” standard in sexual harassment 
cases, Professors Adler and Peirce acknowledge a few concerns that are relevant 
to whether a similar standard should apply to attorney discipline cases.  First, as 
with Model Rule 8.4(g), Title VII bars discriminatory behavior based not only on 
sex, but on other enumerated protected classifications.  Professors Adler and 
Peirce therefore posed the question: “If the courts are to apply a ‘reasonable 
woman’ standard in sexual harassment cases, does this suggest that a ‘reasonable 
victim’ standard will apply in other hostile environment cases?”182  Professors 
Adler and Peirce saw no basis for refusing to extend the standard to cases 
involving other protected classes under Title VII.183  And, from a perspective of 
fairness and consistency, it is only appropriate that courts adopt a similar standard 
in cases involving, for example, race, sexual orientation, national origin, disability 
and religion. 
However, doing so raises other concerns regarding corporate compliance and 
individual fairness.  As Professors Adler and Peirce note, “[t]ailoring the 
workplace to avoid offending ‘reasonable Haitians,’ ‘reasonable blacks,’ 
‘reasonable Asians,’ reasonable Rastafarians,’ ‘reasonable Muslims,’ as well as 
‘reasonable women,’ may prove to be an insuperable task.”184  Moreover, as 
articulated in the sexual harassment context, “[t]he adoption of a ‘sex-specific’ 
standard raises . . . [the question] of whether it is fair to hold males to a standard 
that, because they are males, they may be unable to appreciate or understand 
fully.”185 
B. A Middle Ground 
Under the traditional “reasonable person” standard, when evaluating 
attorney discipline cases under Model Rule 8.4(g), it is the author’s contention that 
 
of Sexual Harassment, N-915-050 (BNA) 89 (Mar. 19, 1990)). 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  See Adler & Peirce, supra note 168, at 777 n.23; Jacquelynne M. Jordan, Little Red Reasonable 
Woman and the Big Bad Bully: Expansion of Title VII and the Larger Problem of Workplace Abuse, 13 WM. & 
MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 621, 630-31 (2007); Elizabeth L. Shoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person versus 
Reasonable Woman: Does It Matter?, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 633, 634-38 (2002). 
 182.  Adler & Peirce, supra note 168, at 822-23. 
 183.  Id. at 823 (referencing the extension by the court in Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 
(D. Me. 1991), vacated in part for other reasons, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991), in its adoption of the 
“reasonable black person” in determining whether a hostile environment existed in a racial 
discrimination case). 
 184.  Id. at 823-24. 
 185.  Id. at 777. 
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we will fall prey to the concerns raised by the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady.186  
In its rejection of the “reasonable person” standard in favor of the “reasonable 
woman” standard, the Ninth Circuit stated that “a sex-blind reasonable person 
standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the 
experiences of women.”187  As noted above, our legal profession is homogenous, 
dominated by Caucasian, straight, financially-stable, fully-abled men.  As a result, 
when evaluating whether an attorney has run afoul of the protections established 
under Model Rule 8.4(g), it is not unreasonable to assume that individual biases 
may creep into those decisions or that those decisions may be colored by the 
“stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior” noted by the EEOC. 
On the flip side, and from a practical perspective, it appears untenable to 
apply a “reasonable victim” standard when evaluating the potential 
discriminatory or harassing behavior of attorneys.  Practically speaking, concerns 
regarding the stifling of free speech, quelling of open debate and forcing of 
political correctness are not unfounded. These concerns harken back to concerns 
addressed by the EEOC and the courts regarding hypersensitive victims. 
But, as noted above, bias and discrimination are prevalent in our judicial 
system and legal profession.  And, as discussed in further detail below, attorneys 
are rarely disciplined for discriminatory behavior, unless such behavior is clearly 
blatant.  So, is there some middle ground? 
As a profession, we are no strangers to being held to a higher standard of 
ethics, morality and integrity as compared to the layperson and other professions.  
“Lawyers have a unique position in society as professionals responsible for 
making our society better.  Our rules of professional conduct require more than 
mere compliance with the law.  Because of our unique position as licensed 
professionals and the power that it brings, we are the standard by which all should 
aspire.”188 
Given the unique privilege and power of our legal profession, it is incumbent 
upon us to take strides to be culturally aware and mindful in the practice of law.  
As evidenced by the statistical and anecdotal information on bias in the profession, 
it should no longer be acceptable for lawyers to turn a blind eye and insulate 
themselves from the obligation to eliminate, as much as feasible, bias, 
discrimination and prejudice from our legal profession.  As such, when evaluating 
complaints filed under Model Rule 8.4(g) or equivalent state rules, rather than 
applying a traditional “reasonable lawyer” standard or imbuing the myriad of 
individual characteristics into a reasonableness analysis under a “reasonable 
victim” standard, bar counsel and the courts should apply a “reasonable culturally 
competent lawyer” standard. 
Under a “reasonable victim” standard, it is understandably challenging for 
lawyers to understand the various topics, comments or conduct that may be 
offensive to each protected category of person.  But by applying an overlay of 
cultural competence, we remove the concerns that disciplinary actions are viewed 
through the lens of the homogeneous makeup of our profession.189  At the same 
 
 186.  Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 187.  Id. at 879. 
 188.  Transcript of American Bar Association Public Hearing, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
 189.  Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary 
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time, we also remove the concerns that lawyers are expected to understand all 
facets of all cultures and social groups or be subject to disciplinary action.  As such, 
when evaluating whether conduct or comment by an attorney rises to the level of 
discrimination or harassment under the rules of professional conduct, the 
“reasonable culturally competent lawyer” standard offers a more balanced 
approach. 
In applying this standard, the question arises as to what characteristics 
compose the reasonable culturally competent lawyer.  As with the application of 
the reasonableness standard across all aspects of the law, those admittedly difficult 
decisions shall be left to the wisdom of bar counsel and the courts.  However, as a 
means of addressing arguments of unfairness in applying the proposed 
“reasonable culturally competent lawyer” standard (i.e., concerns that behavior 
considered to be innocent by reasonable homogenous lawyers may now give rise 
to disciplinary action), it is critical, as discussed further below, that we make 
cultural competency a core aspect of our legal education and practice. 
IV. IS THE INSTITUTION OF A RULE ENOUGH? 
Despite concerns about the perfectness or eloquence of the language of the 
rule190, as a means of fulfilling our obligations as a profession to eliminate bias and 
discrimination in the judicial system, it is critically important that states adopt 
Model Rule 8.4(g) or modify their existing rules of professional conduct to comport 
with the prominence and breadth of the Model Rule.  It is the author’s contention 
though, that merely adopting Model Rule 8.4(g) is not sufficient to rid our legal 
profession (as much as is practicable) of bias and discrimination. 
The history of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct is illustrative of this point.  
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted by the House of Delegates on 
August 7, 1990—just seven years after the first adoption of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.191  Canon 3B(5) originally required judges to perform their 
duties “without bias or prejudice.”192 It also prohibited judges, in the course of 
their judicial duties, or those subject to the judge’s direction from speaking or 
behaving in a way that “manifest[s] bias or prejudice, including but not limited to 
bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, 
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.”193  Canon 3B(6) also called upon  
 
 
Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787-88 (1994) (articulating the construct of the “reasonable racist” in 
the context of criminal law, noting: “For even if the ‘typical’ American believes that blacks’ ‘propensity’ 
toward violence justifies a quicker and more forceful response when a suspected assailant is black, this 
fact is legally significant only if the law defines reasonable beliefs as typical beliefs.  The reasonableness 
inquiry, however, extends beyond typicality to consider the social interests implicated in a given 
situation. Hence not all ‘typical’ beliefs are per se reasonable”). 
 190.  Andrew Strickler, ABA Bias Rule Push Begins Amid Signs of Resistance, LAW360 (Oct. 11, 2016), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/849450?sidebar=true (highlighting Dane Ciolino’s, a professor at 
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, criticisms of Model Rule 8.4(g) on the grounds of “just 
odd rule drafting” and “sloppy draftsmanship” as reasons states will be slow to adopt the rule). 
 191.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990). 
 192.  Id. at Canon 3B(5). 
 193.  Id. 
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judges to require lawyers to refrain from this behavior in “proceedings before the 
judge.”194 
In 2007, the House of Delegates overhauled the Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct, creating Rule 2.3 entitled “Bias, Prejudice and Harassment.”195  This rule 
incorporated the prior language under the 1990 Model Code concerning bias and 
discrimination with a few distinct revisions.  It retained the requirement that 
judges must perform their duties “without bias or prejudice,” but clarified that this 
requirement extended to a judge’s “administrative duties.”196  It also retained the 
provision prohibiting judges, and those subject to their direction, from 
“manifest[ing] bias or prejudice,” including, but not limited to, bias or prejudice 
on the basis of an illustrative list of protected classes.197  But it also remedied a 
significant flaw in Canon 3B(5) by incorporating to the black letter of the rule a 
prohibition against harassment, which was previously relegated to a discussion in 
the comments to the Model Code and limited to only sexual harassment.198  Rule 
2.3 also expanded the illustrative list of protected classes to include gender, 
ethnicity, marital status and political affiliation.199  Moreover, Rule 2.3 maintained 
its call upon judges to require lawyers to refrain from bias, discrimination and 
harassment; however, it included a subtle tweak to the language, clarifying that 
such behavior shall be monitored in “proceedings before the court.”200 
Despite the excellent safeguards to bias, discrimination and harassment in the 
language of the Model Code,201 recent studies show that “people [including 
judges] can’t help but see the world through the lens of their own experiences.”202  
 
 194.  Id. at Canon 3B(6). 
 195.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 196.  Id. at r. 2.3(A). 
 197.  Id. at r. 2.3(B). 
 198.  Id.; see also ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, REPORT TO 
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 49 (2006) (noting that “[t]he Commission agreed that harassment was a form 
of bias or prejudice that the Rules proscribed but wanted to expand it beyond sexual harassment to 
reach other forms of harassment as well”). 
 199.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010); see also ABA JOINT COMM’N TO 
EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, supra note 197 (describing the Commission’s rationale 
for adding four new illustrative protected classes). 
 200.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 201.  See also id. at Canon 1 (“A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the, independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”); 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (“Each justice or judge of the 
United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, 
___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do 
equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform 
all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help 
me God.’”).   
 202.  Jeff Guo, Researchers Have Discovered a New and Surprising Racial Bias in the Criminal Justice 
System, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/ 
2016/02/24/researchers-have-discovered-a-surprising-racial-bias-in-the-criminal-justice-
system/?utm_term=.17afb7d6de30; see also Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: 
Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 314-15 (2012) (“[D]uring 
the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the nomination of then-nominee, now-Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, Senator Jeff Sessions challenged her prior representations that she could be an impartial 
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In 2012, two sociologists issued the results of their empirical analysis examining 
“the issues of whether judges are, or can be, ‘impartial’ and whether empathy is 
compatible with judicial reasoning.”203  Using a comprehensive dataset on federal 
employment civil rights cases, the study found that federal judges with different 
identity characteristics make systematically different decisions; namely, that even 
when taking “into account pro se status—believing that the economic and legal 
resources may influence the viability of a claim—white judges tend to dismiss 
cases involving minority plaintiffs at a much higher rate than cases involving 
white plaintiffs.”204  Based on another empirical study of federal workplace 
harassment cases over a twenty-year period, white judges are half as likely as black 
federal judges to rule in favor of people alleging racial harassment in the 
workplace.205  Conversely, a 2016 study revealed the existence of negative in-group 
bias (preferential treatment of one’s own group) in our judicial system leading to 
harsher punishments toward group members.206  The study evaluated juvenile 
court cases in Louisiana between 1996 and 2012, and found that, all else being 
equal, black juveniles who are randomly assigned to black judges, and white 
juveniles who are randomly assigned to white judges, are five percent more likely 
to get incarcerated (as opposed to being placed on probation) and receive longer 
sentences (approximately 14 percent longer).207 
Additional studies similarly highlight ways in which bias and discrimination 
creep into our judicial process.208  In 2014, three political scientists examined 4,519 
 
judge by quoting remarks she made the day before: ‘You have repeatedly made this statement: ‘I accept 
the proposition that a difference there will be by the presence of women and people of color on the 
bench, and that my experiences affect the facts I choose to see as a judge.’’  Without hesitation, 
Sotomayor responded, ‘the point that I was making was that our life experiences do permit us to see 
some facts and understand them more easily than others.’”) (citing Confirmation Hearing on the 
Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 84 (2009)).   
 203.  Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 201, at 315; see also Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 816-21 (2001) (finding after surveying 167 federal magistrate judges that judges 
were as susceptible to cognitive illusions that produce systemic errors in judgment as lay decision 
makers). 
 204.  Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 201, at 346. 
 205.  Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial 
Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1141 (2009); see also J. J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious 
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2009) (concluding after completing 
an implicit association test on race with 133 judges that judges, just like all other lay persons, showed 
a moderate-to-large degree of implicit racial bias, which can potentially lead to racially disparate 
decisions and outcomes). 
 206.  Briggs Depew, Ozkan Eren and Naci Mocan, Judges, Juveniles and In-Group Bias, NAT’L BUREAU 
OF ECON. RES. 4 (2016). 
 207.  Id.  
 208.  Relatedly, research from the University of Virginia School of Medicine and Sam Houston State 
University has revealed that forensic psychologists and psychiatrists, who like judges are ethically 
bound to be impartial when performing evaluations or providing expert opinions in court, may 
actually be influenced by which party is issuing their paycheck.  Bias in the Courtroom: Study Finds 
Impartial Experts not so Impartial, UVA TODAY (Apr. 12, 2013), https://news.virginia.edu/content/bias-
courtroom-study-finds-impartial-experts-not-so-impartial (“In a real-world experiment, experts who  
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votes in 516 First Amendment cases resolved by the Supreme Court from 1953 to 
2010 to determine whether “justices defend the speech they hate.”209  Based on the 
study’s findings, it appears they do so rarely.  Rather, “Supreme Court justices are 
opportunistic supporters of free speech.  That is, liberal (conservative) justices are 
supportive of free speech when the speaker is liberal (conservative).”210  In other 
words, both liberal and conservative justices are more likely to vote in support of 
a speaker if the speaker shares their ideology.  In recognizing the importance of 
the study, Erwin Chemerinsky, dean of the University of California, Irvine School 
of Law, said, “[I]t offers an explanation for justices’ behavior in First Amendment 
cases and shows how much justices’ ideology influences the speech they are 
willing to protect.”211 
A recent study by Professor Maya Sen of the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government at Harvard University revealed that on average black federal district 
court judges have a roughly 10 percent greater likelihood of being reversed by the 
federal appellate courts compared to the reversal rate for their white colleagues.212  
Professor Sen analyzed the reversal rate for 1,054 federal district court judges from 
2000 to 2012 and controlled for “previous professional and judicial experience, 
educational background, qualification ratings assigned by the American Bar 
Association, and differences in appellate panel composition.”213  Professor Sen 
found that “[c]lose to 3,000 federal court decisions would have been upheld if 
black judges were overturned” at the same rate as white judges.214  An explanation 
for the study’s results is that “appeals panels somehow implicitly rely on the race 
of the lower-court judge in reaching decisions.”215 
In its study on bias in California Supreme Court cases, the State of California 
Commission on Judicial Performance highlighted twenty-four instances from 1970 
through 2011 in which a California Supreme Court judge was publically 
admonished, reprimanded or removed from office for engaging in bias, 
discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, ethnicity and/or national 
origin.216  As an example, the study noted a 2011 case in which a judge was 
publically admonished for remarking in open court in a criminal case involving 
African-American defendants that “the only thing that would make the 
 
believed they were working for prosecutors tended to conclude that sexually violent offenders were at 
greater risk of re-offending than did experts who thought they were working for the defense.”).;  
 209.  Lee Epstein et al., Do Justices Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the 
First Amendment, 1, 7 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroup 
Bias.pdf. 
 210.  Id. at abstract. 
 211.  Adam Liptak, For Justices, Free Speech Often Means ‘Speech I Agree With’, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 
2014), at A15, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/us/politics/in-justices-votes-free-speech-often-
means-speech-i-agree-with.html?_r=1. 
 212.  Maya Sen, Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in US Courts, 44 J. OF LEGAL STUD. S187, 
S188 (2015). 
 213.  Id. at S187. 
 214.  Id. at S221. 
 215.  Id. at S217. 
 216.  STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT INVOLVING BIAS: 
ETHNICITY, NATIONALITY, RACE, GENDER AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 2–5 (2015). 
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defendants plead was for him to come out in a white sheet and pointy hat.”217  The 
study also outlined fifteen instances from 1973 through 2012 in which a California 
Supreme Court judge was disciplined for engaging in sexual harassment or gender 
bias,218 and two instances of bias based on sexual orientation, including a case in 
which a judge chastised a minor’s parent in open court and in the presence of the 
minor, blaming the parent’s sexual orientation as the cause of the minor’s 
misbehavior.219 
Similarly, several appellate courts have found bias by immigration law 
judges on the basis of ethnicity or national origin.  Such bias manifested in the 
manner in which the judge treated the immigrant, for example, speaking “in an 
argumentative, sarcastic, and sometimes arguably insulting manner, engag[ing] in 
bullying until the petitioner was ground to bits, appear[ing] unseemly, 
intemperate, and even mocking or [taking] on the role of a prosecutor anxious to 
pick holes in the petitioner’s story.”220  So, notwithstanding almost thirty years of 
our judiciary being governed by a model code with strong language to safeguard 
against bias and discrimination, such behavior is still prevalent among our 
judiciary. 
When evaluating attorney discipline cases, it likewise appears that a mere 
rule is not sufficient to bring about pronounced change.  As noted above, twenty-
five jurisdictions have already adopted into the black letter of their rules of 
professional conduct provisions to protect against bias, discrimination and/or 
harassment in the legal profession.221  Moreover, the rules of professional conduct 
in thirteen jurisdictions have incorporated an anti-discrimination provision by 
tracking the language under Model Rule 8.4(d) and its preexisting Comment 3.222  
Though such jurisdictions are disciplining attorneys for discriminating and 
harassing conduct,223 in comparison to the statistical and anecdotal information  
 
 
 217.  Id. at 2. 
 218.  Id. at 5–7. 
 219.  Id. at 7. 
 220.  Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 424 (2011) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also id. at 420–21 (highlighting examples of explicit 
bias within the immigration court system where immigration law judges have been rebuked by 
appellate courts for “launch[ing] into a diatribe against Chinese immigrants lying on the witness stand, 
spanning twelve pages of transcript, telling an asylum applicant, the whole world does not revolve 
around you and the other Indonesians that just want to live here because they enjoy the United States, 
or, without any explanation, labeling asylum applicants as religious zealots whose exercise of religion 
was offensive to a majority” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 221.  See supra note 38.  
 222.  See supra note 39. 
 223.  See e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moothart, 860 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 2015) 
(disciplining a lawyer for sexually harassing four female clients and one female employee); In re Kratz, 
851 N.W.2d 219 (Wis. 2014) (disciplining a district attorney for sending over 25 texts of a sexual nature 
to a victim of domestic violence); In re Griffith, 838 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. 2013) (disciplining a lawyer who, 
while acting as an adjunct professor and supervising law students in a clinic, made sexual advances to 
students); In re McGrath, 280 P.3d 1091 (Wash. 2012) (disciplining a lawyer for sending two ex parte 
communications to the trial judge inquiring as to whether he was going to believe an alien (the 
opposing party was Canadian) or a U.S. citizen (his client was his wife)). 
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regarding bias and discrimination in the profession, they are doing so only in a 
limited number of instances. 
Unfortunately, a comprehensive analysis of the number of complaints filed 
under the anti-discrimination and anti-harassment provisions in every state, and 
if relevant, the resulting disciplinary action remains elusive.  Many states do not 
maintain public records of the complaints filed, but rather only publish the records 
of those cases leading to disciplinary action.224  Relatedly, many states retain their 
disciplinary records in a manner that is challenging to search – whether manually 
due to paper filing systems or request procedures225 or electronically due to limited 
search criteria or cumbersome search mechanisms via online portals.226 
Regardless, the disciplinary records from several states prove instructive.  
When evaluating attorney discipline records and cases in Illinois over the last ten 
years,227 only three disciplinary actions and sanctions have been brought against 
 
 224.  See e.g., Grievance Decisions by Name, STATE OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/sgcdecisions/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (providing access only to disciplinary 
decisions); but see, e.g., Annual Reports, MINN. LAWYERS PROF’L RESPON. BD., http://lprb.mncourts. 
gov/AboutUs/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (providing links to annual reports 
from 1999 to 2016 that include statistics on the number of complaints filed and closed each year). 
 225.  In attempting to secure the disciplinary records pertaining to the anti-discrimination and/or 
anti-harassment provisions in each state, Alabama, Alaska, Nevada, Rhode Island and South Dakota 
do not retain their disciplinary records in an electronic format accessible to the public and therefore 
require the submission of records requests, which often necessitate labor-intensive manual searches by 
the relevant entity to locate the disciplinary actions responsive to the records requests. 
 226.  See e.g., Orders and Opinions Regarding Final Resolution in Attorney Disciplinary Cases, JUD. 
BRANCH OF IND., http://www.in.gov/judiciary/4730.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (requiring users to 
search by year and then click on links for each decision issued that year to determine whether a decision 
pertains to a particular disciplinary rule); MINN. LAWYERS PROF’L RESPON. BD., supra note 223 
(providing links to annual reports from 1999 to 2016 that provide a limited overview of the disciplinary 
process, including a chart of “Areas of Misconduct” that is challenging to decipher whether any “areas” 
apply to disciplinary actions under the anti-discrimination and anti-harassment provisions articulated 
in Rules 8.4(g) or (h) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct); Public Orders Imposed Against 
Nebraska Attorneys, STATE OF NEB. JUD. BRANCH, https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/attorney-sanctions 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (requiring users to search exclusively by the last name of the disciplined 
Nebraska attorney); Disciplinary Quarterly Reports, THE DISCIPLINARY BD. OF THE N.M. SUP. CT., 
https://www.nmdisboard.org/QuarterlyReport.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (providing links to 
quarterly reports from 2007 to 2016 that contain brief summaries of certain disciplinary actions, but no 
easy mechanism for identifying cases that that violate this aspect of the rule); Annual Reports on the 
Committee on Professional Discipline, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.nysba.org/copdannualreports/ 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (providing links to annual professional discipline reports from 2002 to 2015 
that provide only high level statistics of discipline cases with no information regarding the number of 
cases violating a particular rule of conduct); OPC History of Annual Reports, UTAH STATE BAR, 
http://www.utahbar.org/opc/opc-history-of-annual-reports/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (providing links 
to annual reports that provide a high level summary of the number of cases and disciplinary decisions, 
but no relevant information regarding the number of cases violating a particular professional rule of 
conduct). 
 227.  When using the Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission’s online portal, the author 
inputted the following separate search terms: (i) “8.4(j)”; (ii) “‘8.4(d)’ & ‘bias’”; (iii) “‘8.4(d)’ & ‘race’ OR 
‘sex’ OR ‘religion’ OR ‘national origin’ OR ‘disability’ OR ‘age’ OR ‘sexual orientation’ OR 
‘socioeconomic status’”; (iv) “‘8.4(a)(5) & ‘discriminatory’”; and (v) “8.4(a)(9)(A).”  See Disciplinary 
Reports and Decisions Search, SUP. CT. OF ILL., https://www.iardc.org/rd_database/rulesdecisions.html 
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attorneys for discrimination or harassment under the current Illinois Rules of 
Professional Conduct 8.4(d) and 8.4(j) as well as their predecessors Illinois Rules 
of Professional Conduct 8.4(a)(5) and 8.4(a)(9)(A).228  Similarly, within the last ten 
years, only four Indiana attorneys have been subject to disciplinary action for 
discriminatory conduct in violation Rule 8.4(g) of the Indiana Rules of Professional 
Conduct.229  In Connecticut, only one attorney has been disciplined for violating 
Rule 8.4(4) of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct.230  Moreover, not a 
 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017).  Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) and its Comment 3 tracks the 
language of Model Rule 8.4(d) and its preexisting Comment 3.  ILL. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d), 
cmt. 3 (2017).  Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(j) makes it professional misconduct to: 
[V]iolate a federal, state or local statute or ordinance that prohibits discrimination based on 
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status 
by conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer. Whether a 
discriminatory act reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer shall be determined 
after consideration of all the circumstances, including: the seriousness of the act; whether the 
lawyer knew that the act was prohibited by statute or ordinance; whether the act was part of 
a pattern of prohibited conduct; and whether the act was committed in connection with the 
lawyer’s professional activities. No charge of professional misconduct may be brought 
pursuant to this paragraph until a court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction 
has found that the lawyer has engaged in an unlawful discriminatory act, and the finding of 
the court or administrative agency has become final and enforceable and any right of judicial 
review has been exhausted. 
Id. at r. 8.4(j).  Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(a)(5) and 8.4(a)(9)(A) were the predecessors to 
Rules 8.4(d) and 8.4(j), which were adopted in 2009.  See ILL. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a)(5), 
8.4(a)(9)(A) (2008). 
 228.  In re Contee Jones, Jr., M.R. 26769, 2014PR00045 (Ill. Att’y Registration and Disciplinary 
Comm’n Sept. 12, 2014) (disbarring an attorney for sexually exploiting two associates, one legal 
assistant and one assistant office manager employed by his law firm over whom he had supervisory 
authority); In re Garnati, M.R. 26733, 2013PR00124 (Ill. Att’y Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n 
Sept. 12, 2014) (disciplining a prosecutor for making improper and racially-based arguments during 
the prosecution of a murder case where both the defendant and the victim were black); In re Hoffman, 
No. 08 SH 65 (Ill. Att’y Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n Jun. 23, 2010) (disciplining an attorney 
for making a derogatory comment to opposing counsel based on his religion). 
 229.  In re Barker, 993 N.E.2d 1138 (Ind. 2013) (suspending an attorney for accusing a mother in a 
dissolution action of being in the country illegally); In re Kelley, 925 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. 2010) (publically 
reprimanded an attorney for making gratuitous comments about a company representative’s sexual 
orientation); In re McCarthy, 938 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 2010) (suspending an attorney for inappropriately 
using the word “nigger” in an email to his client); In re Campiti, 937 N.E.2d 340 (Ind. 2009) (disciplining 
a lawyer who at a child support modification hearing made disparaging references to the fact that the 
mother was not a U.S. citizen).  As noted above, see supra note 225, Indiana’s online portal requires 
users to search by year and then click on individual links for each decision issued that year to determine 
the nature of the disciplinary action.  As such a methodology is time consuming and inefficient, the 
author completed a Westlaw search to locate the above-referenced disciplinary actions under Rule 
8.4(g).  Rule 8.4(g) provides that it is professional misconduct for an Indiana lawyer to: 
[E]ngage in conduct, in a professional capacity, manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or 
prejudice based upon race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, 
age, socioeconomic status, or similar factors. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing 
factors does not violate this subsection. A trial judge’s finding that preemptory challenges 
were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this Rule. 
IND. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2017).   
 230.  In re Mayo, No. 08-0767 (Conn. Statewide Grievance Comm. Sept. 18, 2009) (disciplining an 
attorney for failing to steer his practice away from the representation of women in domestic relations 
matters to protect them from unwanted and inappropriate sexual advances).  Rule 8.4(4) of the 
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single attorney has been sanctioned for discrimination or harassment in the last 
seven years under Rule 8.4(d) of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct,231 nor  
within the last decade under Rule 8.4(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional  
Conduct232, Rule 8.4(g) of the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct233 or Rule 
8.4(i) of the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct.234 
 
Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct and its commentary tracks the language of Model Rule 
8.4(d) and its preexisting Comment 3.  CONN. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(4), commentary (2017).  
Using Connecticut’s online portal, the author conducted a Boolean search using the terms “8.4(4)” and 
“bias,” “prejudice,” “harass,” “race,” “sex,” “religion,” “disability,” “national origin” and 
“socioeconomic.”  STATE OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 223. 
 231.  Rule 8.4(d) of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct and its commentary tracks the 
language of Model Rule 8.4(d) and its preexisting Comment 3.  ME. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d), 
cmt. 3 (2017).  In searching Maine’s disciplinary records, the author used the search term “8.4(d)” and 
reviewed all resulting disciplinary files.  Court and Grievance Decisions, STATE OF ME. BD. OF OVERSEERS 
OF THE BAR, http://www.mebaroverseers.org/tools/whatsnew/index.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 232.  Rule 8.4(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct tracks the language of Model Rule 
8.4(d).  ARK. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (2017).  Its Comment 3 however states: 
Subdivision (d) of this rule proscribes conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. Such proscription includes the prohibition against discriminatory conduct 
committed by a lawyer while performing duties in connection with the practice of law. The 
proscription extends to any characteristic or status that is not relevant to the proof of any 
legal or factual issue in dispute. Such discriminatory conduct, when directed towards 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, other lawyers, or the court, including race, sex, religion, national 
origin, or any other similar factors, subverts the administration of justice and undermines 
the public’s confidence in our system of justice, as well as notions of equality. Legitimate 
advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge’s 
finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone 
establish a violation of this rule. This subdivision does not prohibit a lawyer from 
representing a client accused of committing discriminatory conduct. 
Id. at cmt. 3. In searching for disciplinary actions under Rule 8.4(d), the author reviewed the annual 
reports issued by the Arkansas Supreme Court’s Committee on Professional Conduct and Office of 
Professional Conduct from 2006 to 2015.  Professional Conduct Forms, ARK. JUD., https://courts.arkansas.  
gov/administration/professional-conduct/annual-reports (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 233.  Rule 8.4(g) of the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct makes it professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to:  
[C]ommit a discriminatory act prohibited by state law on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, 
religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, or marital status, where the act 
of discrimination is committed in connection with the lawyer’s professional activities.  In 
addition, it is professional misconduct to commit a discriminatory act on the basis of sexual 
orientation if such an act would violate this Rule when committed on the basis of sex, race, 
age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, or marital status.  This Rule shall not 
limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline, or withdraw from the representation of a client 
in accordance with Rule 1.16. 
WASH. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2017).  Using Washington’s Discipline Notice Search online 
portal to search for disciplinary actions under Rule 8.4(g), the author, in the dropdown menu for “RPC 
Code,” selected “8.4 (g) – Commit a Discriminatory Act” and received the following result message: 
“Your search returned no results. Please try again.”  Discipline Notice Search, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.mywsba.org/DisciplineNotice.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 234.   Rule 8.4(i) of the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys makes it professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to “harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national 
origin, disability, sexual preference or marital status in connection with the lawyer’s professional 
activities. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate par. (i).”  20 WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 8.4 (West 2017).  In searching for violations of Rule 8.4(i) by Wisconsin attorneys, the author 
reviewed all documentation generated when searching for “8.4” through Wisconsin’s online portal.  
MACRO FINAL Keith (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2018  6:55 PM 
CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN A POST-MODEL RULE 8.4(G) WORLD  35 
Though it is possible that the adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g) or similar 
revisions to equivalent state rules of professional conduct will lead to a surge of 
disciplinary actions, it is unlikely.  With a homogenous legal profession coupled 
with a lack of infrastructure for cultural competency training, the likelihood of 
holding attorneys accountable for bias and discriminatory behavior that is less 
than blatant is nil.  Even the SCEPR in its revised report on Resolution 109 to the 
House of Delegates admitted that “[t]he supreme courts of the jurisdictions that 
have black letter rules with antidiscrimination and anti-harassment provisions 
have not seen a surge in complaints based on these provisions.”235  As a result, 
though the adoption of the anti-discrimination and anti-harassment provisions as 
laid out in Model Rule 8.4(g) was (and is) a necessary step, it is insufficient alone 
to lead to marked changed within our legal profession.  In short, it is incumbent 
upon our profession to become more culturally competent and, therefore, it is 
critical that we develop the necessary infrastructure to facilitate cultural 
competency education. 
V. A CULTURAL COMPETENCY INFRASTRUCTURE 
In light of the evidence of bias and discrimination in our legal profession, it 
should no longer be tolerated for lawyers to ignore and insulate themselves and 
our profession from the obligation to make cultural competency a core aspect of 
our legal education and practice.  It is also imperative that members of our legal 
profession, bar counsel and the courts hold lawyers (and judges) accountable for 
violating the rules.  As “the legal profession is largely self-governing,”236 it is 
incumbent upon us to remedy our system where it is flawed—and a lack of a 
cultural competency infrastructure is a glaring flaw in need of a remedy.  This 
Article therefore focuses on three key reforms: the revision of the ABA’s law school 
accreditation standards; the implementation of continuing legal education 
requirements; and the inclusion of language in the Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct requiring cultural competency education. 
 
 
Wisconsin Attorneys’ Professional Discipline Compendium, WIS. CT. SYS., https://compendium.wicourts. 
gov/app/search (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
 235.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 6.  According to Wendi S. Lazar, Chair of the ABA 
Commission on Women in the Profession, the lack of complaints is also attributable to fear of retaliation 
by victims of discrimination and harassment: 
Many of my clients have experienced harassment and discrimination.  Some of them have 
been victim to behaviors that are unspeakable here today.  Others have been asked to leave 
firms because they have complained about sexual harassment and have been retaliated 
against because they have complained about race discrimination.  What they all have in 
common is that they knew that complaining or suing in court would not give them justice—
not in our profession, sadly.  The barriers to justice are just too costly for those starting out 
in their careers or those deeply invested.  Rather they would be further victimized, asked 
politely, or not so politely, to leave the firm, sign a release, receive a severance payment or 
less, or worse be forced to leave without a trace maybe because they just wouldn’t have sex 
with the senior partner at their firm.  She leaves, he stays.  Business as usual. 
House of Delegates: Rule Against Harassment and Discrimination, supra note 22, at 15:50-16:55. 
 236.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, AM. BAR ASS’N, Preamble & Scope [10] (2016). 
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A. Cultural Competency in Legal Education 
While the author applauds the ABA for its efforts in passing Model Rule 
8.4(g), the author urges the ABA to go one step further and revise its accreditation 
standards to require law schools to offer, and law students to complete, cultural 
competency coursework.  Under Standard 302 of the ABA’s Standards and Rules 
of Procedures for Approval of Law Schools: 
A law school shall establish learning outcomes that shall, at a minimum, include 
competency in the following: 
(a) Knowledge and understanding of substantive and procedural law; 
(b) Legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem-solving, and written and 
oral communication in the legal context; 
(c) Exercise of proper professional and ethical responsibilities to clients and the 
legal system; and 
(d) Other professional skills needed for the competent and ethical participation as 
a member of the legal profession.237 
Interpretation 302-1 provides additional guidance regarding Standard 302(d), 
stating that “other professional skills are determined by the law school and may 
include skills such as, interviewing, counseling, negotiation, fact development and 
analysis, trial practice, document drafting, conflict resolution, organization and 
management of legal work, collaboration, cultural competency, and self-
evaluation.”238  As a result, law schools may, but are not required to, ensure that 
their law students receive cultural competency education prior to graduation. 
This is incongruous with the ABA’s mandate under Goal III to “[e]liminate 
bias in the legal profession and the justice system.”239  Education on bias—both 
explicit and implicit—and ways in which to de-bias240 are critical to ensuring that 
 
 237.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS 
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2015-2016 15 (2015). 
 238.  Id. at 16. 
 239.  ABA Mission and Goals, supra note 24. 
 240.  A variety of different strategies exist for attempting to de-bias, including educating oneself on 
becoming more self-aware and mindful, exposing oneself to a variety of individuals from diverse 
backgrounds and social groups to break down any stereotypes or preconceived notions about those 
individuals, attempting to step into the shoes of individuals from diverse backgrounds and social 
groups to see the world from their perspective, undertaking a self-audit of one’s social networks and 
social media choices and changing one’s approach to the way one interacts with people by reducing 
one’s cognitive load and consciously thinking through why one is making certain decisions or reacting 
a certain way towards certain individuals.  See Sue Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Five Habits for Cross-
Cultural Lawyering, in RACE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 47 (Kimberly Holt Barrett & William H. 
George eds., 2005); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 
CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001); Building Community Trust: Improving Cross-Cultural Communication in the 
Criminal Justice System, AM. BAR ASS’N CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/criminal_justice/pages/buildingcommunity.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).  The New York 
Times video series entitled Who, Me? Biased? highlights, as an example, criticism that because 
orchestras were heavily male-dominated, bias existed in the audition selection process.  Reshamwala, 
supra note 81.  In response, orchestras put up a screen to attempt to hide the gender of the individual 
auditioning.  Id.  At first, placing screen between the musician and the selection committee did not alter 
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we, as lawyers and legal professionals, are able to eradicate, to the extent possible, 
discrimination and prejudice from our profession.  And, such education should 
begin when an individual matriculates into a law school. 
As such, the ABA should propose to the House of Delegates a revision to the 
accreditation standards that adds a new paragraph to Standard 302.  Though the 
exact language of the new paragraph may require further study, the language 
would require law schools to establish learning outcomes that include competency 
in the knowledge and understanding of behaviors, attitudes and policies that 
enable the legal profession to work (or prevent the legal profession from working) 
effectively in cross-cultural situations.  In other words, the requirement would 
obligate law schools to ensure that law students develop “the ability to adapt, 
work and manage successfully in new and unfamiliar cultural settings”241 and to 
create effective working relationships with clients from different backgrounds or 
social groups.242 
B. Cultural Competency as a Bar Licensure Requirement 
“Attaining cultural competence is an ongoing process requiring a long term 
educational commitment.  One does not ‘become competent’ at any one point.  
Instead, he or she becomes more knowledgeable, aware and sensitive in an 
attempt to reach competence.”243  As such, continual cultural competency 
education is necessary to manifest a cultural shift within our profession. 
Under the ABA’s existing Model Rule for Continuing Legal Education (CLE), 
a comment encourages participation in CLEs covering bias and discrimination: 
Regulatory systems should require that lawyers, as part of their mandatory 
continuing legal education either through a separate credit or through existing 
ethics and professionalism credits, complete programs related to the promotion of 
 
much the percentage of men and women hired by orchestras.  Id.  That is until it became apparent that 
before some of the auditions, there was a “click, click, clicking” sound of high heels.  Id.  Once orchestras 
asked those auditioning to remove their shoes, however, the percentage of men and women hired 
became almost equal.  Id.; see also id. (encouraging individuals to de-bias by completing a self-audit to 
detect implicit bias by asking a friend to observe their behavior or by taking stock of the cultural groups 
their friends either fall into or self-identify with). 
 241.  Sylvia Stevens, Cultural Competency: Is There an Ethical Duty?, OR. STATE BAR BULLETIN, Jan. 
2009, https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/09jan/barcounsel.html. 
 242.  The manner in which law schools undertake to comply with this requirement will of course 
vary across law schools, however, law schools may choose to develop a series of courses addressing 
cultural competence, infuse cultural competence into existing courses and clinics or develop a 
mandatory seminar, akin to the mandatory ethics courses at many law schools.  See e.g., Serena Patel, 
Cultural Competency Training: Preparing Law Students for Practice in Our Multicultural World, 62 UCLA L. 
REV. DISC. 140, 149–56 (2014) (proposing the basic structure of a seminar on cultural competence and 
the incorporation of Professors Susan Bryant and Jean Koh Peters’ Five Habits); Cynthia M. Ward & 
Nelson P. Miller, The Role of Law Schools in Shaping Culturally Competent Lawyers, MICH. BAR J., Sept. 
2011, at 4 (describing a scenario in which faculty could incorporate cultural competency training into 
a doctrinal course by noting “[c]ontracts professors could encourage students to consider whether the 
‘meeting of the minds’ and ‘contract formation’ analyses change when you have parties of different 
culture.”). 
 243.  POVERTY, HEALTH AND LAW: READINGS AND CASES FOR MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP 144 
(Elizabeth T. Tyler et al. eds., 2011). 
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racial and ethnic diversity in the legal profession, the promotion of full and equal 
participation in the profession of women and persons with disabilities, and the 
elimination of all forms of bias in the profession. Lawyers who practice in states 
and territories that do not require mandatory continuing legal education are 
encouraged to complete such programs as part of their continuing legal 
education.244 
However, currently, only California, Minnesota and Oregon require specific 
“elimination of bias” programming for attorneys to maintain their bar licenses 
within those states,245 while Hawaii, Kansas, Illinois, Maine, Nebraska, 
Washington and West Virginia allow such programming to count towards 
attorneys’ ethics and professionalism requirements.246 
On December 21, 2016, after two years of discussion and drafting, the ABA 
Standing Committee on Continuing Legal Education (SCOCLE) announced its 
decision to propose a new Mandatory CLE (MCLE) Model Rule and submit a 
resolution and report for the 2017 Midyear Meeting of the ABA House of 
Delegates.247  In the proposal, the SCOCLE overhauled the rule and provided more 
specific guidance on continuing education on bias and diversity in the black letter 
of the rule.  The new Section 3, entitled MCLE Requirements and Exemptions, 
requires under part (A): 
(2) As part of the required Credit Hours referenced in Section 3(A)(1), lawyers 
must earn Credit Hours in each of the following areas: 
(a)   Ethics and Professionalism Programming (an average of at least one Credit 
Hour per year); 
(b)   Mental Health and Substance Use Disorders Programming (at least one Credit 
Hour every three years); and 
 
 244.  MODEL RULES FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. § 2 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004). 
 245.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., COMM’N ON LAWYER 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, LAW PRACTICE DIVISION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 9 n.12 (2017); see 
also CAL. RULES FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. r. 2.72(A)(2) (2014) (requiring California bar 
members to complete one hour every three years of continuing legal education that “deal[s] with the 
recognition and elimination of bias in the legal profession and society by reason of, but not limited to, 
sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, physical disability, age, or sexual orientation”); 
MINN. RULES OF THE BD. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. r. 2(G), 6(B), 9(B)(2) (2016) (requiring Minnesota 
bar members to complete every three years at least two hours of “elimination of bias” courses, which 
it defines as “a course directly related to the practice of law that is designed to educate attorneys to 
identify and eliminate from the legal profession and from the practice of law biases against persons 
because of race, gender, economic status, creed, color, religion, national origin, disability, age or sexual 
orientation.”); OR. MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. RULES AND REGULATIONS r. 3.2(d), 5.15(c) 
(2017) (requiring Oregon bar members to complete in alternate reporting period at least three hours of 
“access to justice” courses, which it defines as an activity “directly related to the practice of law and 
designed to educate attorneys to identify and eliminate from the legal profession and from the practice 
of law barriers to access to justice arising from  biases against persons because of race, gender, economic 
status, creed, color, religion, national origin, disability, age or sexual orientation”). 
 246.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 244, at 9 n.12. 
 247.  See Proposed MCLE Model Rule, AMER. BAR ASS’N, https://americanbar.qualtrics.com/ 
jfe/form/SV_9MioUUDJCatwy5D (posting a notification on December 21, 2016, welcoming comments 
and questions to the proposed model rule). 
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(c)   Diversity and Inclusion Programming (at least one Credit Hour every three 
years).248 
As part of its rationale, the SCOCLE noted that “Diversity and Inclusion 
Programming” will “educate lawyers about implicit bias, the needs of specific 
diverse populations, and ways to increase diversity in the legal profession.”249  In 
February 2016, the ABA House of Delegates recognized the importance of such 
programming when it adopted Resolution 107, which encourages jurisdictions 
with MCLE requirements to “include as a separate credit programs regarding 
diversity and inclusion in the legal profession of all persons regardless of race, 
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disabilities, and programs 
regarding the elimination of bias.”250  The new MCLE Model Rule requires the 
implementation of a stand-alone credit requirement251; however, under Comment 
4 of the new Section 3, the SCOCLE recognized that some jurisdictions may prefer 
to require and accredit such programs under their ethics and professionalism 
requirement.252  The SCOCLE noted though that “it is extremely unlikely that one 
hundred percent of lawyers will elect to take Diversity and Inclusion 
Programming if it is not specifically required, which is why [the new] Model Rule 
recommends a stand-alone requirement.”253 
In February 2017, the House of Delegates approved the proposed new MCLE 
Model Rule, which was another bold and necessary step towards the elimination 
of bias and discrimination in our profession.  The author therefore urges states to 
adopt the new rule or modify their existing CLE requirements for attorneys to 
maintain their legal license to comport with the recommendations of the new rule 
with respect to mandating through a stand-along requirement training on bias, 
diversity and cultural competency. 
C. A Fair & Impartial Judiciary 
With respect to the judiciary, Rule 2.3 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
already provides significant protections against bias, prejudice and 
discrimination.  It requires that a judge must perform the duties of the judicial 
office “without bias or prejudice.”254  It further requires that a judge, in the 
performance of judicial duties, shall not, nor shall those subject to the judge’s 
direction, speak or behave in a way that “manifest[s] bias or prejudice” or engage 
in “harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, 
disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political 
affiliation. . . .”255  It also calls upon judges to require lawyers to refrain from this  
 
 
 248.  MODEL RULE FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. § 3, 3(A)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
 249.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 244 at 8. 
 250.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 107 (ADOPTED) (2016). 
 251.  MODEL RULE FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. § 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
 252.  Id. at cmt. 4. 
 253.  AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 244 at 9 n.12. 
 254.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 255.  Id. at r. 2.3(B). 
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behavior in “proceedings before the court. . . .”256  The comments to the rule also 
provide critical guidance, noting that: 
Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited to 
epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor 
based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of 
connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant 
references to personal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body language 
can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others 
an appearance of bias or prejudice. A judge must avoid conduct that may 
reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.257 
 But as the preamble to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct articulates: 
An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of 
justice.  The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an 
independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women 
of integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society.  Thus, the 
judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule of 
law.258 
It is therefore the author’s opinion that the judiciary should be held to the 
highest standard of care possible.  Despite the comprehensiveness of the language 
of the Model Code, plenty of evidence exists to suggest that the judiciary is not 
living up to the standard of care articulated within the code.259  As Judge Bernice 
B. Donald, a federal judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, stated, “We view our job functions through the lens of our experiences, 
and all of us are impacted by biases and stereotypes and other cognitive functions 
that enable us to take shortcuts in what we do.”260 
[J]udges, like the rest of us, carry implicit biases . . . . [T]hese implicit biases can 
affect judges’ judgment, at least in contexts where judges are unaware of a need to 
monitor their decisions . . . . [C]onversely, when judges are aware of a need to 
monitor their own responses for the influence of implicit [] biases, and are 
motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.261 
As such, with a minor tweak to the black letter of the Model Code requiring 
the judiciary to engage in regular and frequent cultural competency training, 
 
 256.  Id. at r. 2.3(C). 
 257.  Id. at r. 2.3 cmt. 2. 
 258.  Id. at preamble ¶ 1. 
 259.  See supra Part IV. 
 260.  Terry Carter, Implicit Bias is a Challenge Even for Judges, ABA J. (Aug. 5, 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/implicit_bias_is_a_challenge_even_for_judges. 
 261.  Rachlinski, supra note 187, at 1221; see also Dana Leigh Marks, Who, Me? Am I Guilty of Implicit 
Bias?, 54 THE JUDGES’ J. 20 (Fall 2015) (acknowledging as an immigration judge and president of the 
National Association of Immigration Judges that “we must accept that we are all the product of 
environmental factors that imbue some degree of implicit bias and do our best to counteract its 
destructive effects,” stressing that “[i]t is important that judges address the dilemma of implicit bias 
vigorously” and advocating for “structural support, which means more time off the bench through 
adjustment of dockets and reduced distractions. . .to ensure that [judges] have sufficient time on their 
dockets to address the constant fight against implicit bias.”). 
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which in turn will help them become more conscious of monitoring their own 
biases, and with a conscious effort by the profession to hold judges accountable 
under Rule 2.3, it is feasible that judges will be able to more readily fulfill this high 
standard.262 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the face of a legal profession and judicial system replete with bias, 
discrimination and harassment, the American Bar Association is to be commended 
for tackling a controversial topic and successfully inserting an anti-discrimination 
and anti-harassment provision into the black letter of our rules of professional 
conduct.  But, we must not now become complacent and believe our work is done.  
Though a vital step, adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g) alone is insufficient to spark 
the much-needed cultural shift within our legal profession. 
It is now time to ensure that the states not only adopt Model Rule 8.4(g) or 
revise their existing rules of professional conduct to comport with the breadth and 
depth of conduct governed by the rule; but also hold members of the profession 
accountable for violating the rule.  In doing so, it is imperative that bar counsel 
and the courts avoid evaluating attorney discipline complaints under Model Rule 
8.4(g) through the lens of the “reasonable lawyer,” which is unfortunately a 
homogenous being capable of infusing bias into such decisions.  Rather, when 
evaluating the mens rea standard in attorney discipline cases, the relevant decision 
makers should invoke the “reasonably culturally competent lawyer,” a mindful, 
self-aware lawyer of “reasonable prudence and [cultural] competence.” 
Moreover, it is time for us to critically evaluate our cultural competency 
infrastructure—or lack thereof—and raise the bar of attorney and judicial conduct.  
The proposed reforms—the revision of law school accreditation standards, the 
implementation of continuing legal education requirements and the inclusion of 
mandatory cultural competency training for the judiciary—will, if implemented, 
encourage all lawyers and judges to become more self-aware and mindful and 
ignite the necessary cultural shift in our profession.  But most importantly, the 
proposed reforms will remove, as much as practical, bias, prejudice, 
discrimination and harassment from our legal profession and judicial system, 
helping to fulfill our promise that “justice is blind.” 
 
 
 262.  See Carter, supra note 259 (“Judges are tasked with being the most impartial members of the 
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to do—and perhaps even impossible when it comes to implicit bias.  But working to overcome biases 
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